Negotiating an End to Somalia's War with al Shabaab

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Snapshot

The Splintering of Al Shabaab

Bronwyn Bruton and J. Peter Pham

By some measures, the ad-hoc alliance among Ethiopia, Kenya, and the African Union has come close to defeating the terrorist group al Shabaab. But a military victory could scatter the group's most radical leaders across the Horn of Africa.

An AMISOM commander in the Yaaqshiid District of Mogadishu. (AU/UN-IST / flickr)

In August 2011, after three years of fighting, forces backing the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) took control of the Somali capital of Mogadishu. Although this was a welcome development, it was a short-term tactical gain. The strategy that the government and international community are now employing to stabilize Somalia neglects reconciliation with the rebels and relies too much on external military muscle. Further, aside from the efforts of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), military involvement in Somalia has been counterproductive.

The Somali government and its backers should instead focus on establishing a competent security sector and starting genuine negotiations with those rebels who are interested in a political solution -- and there are some. It has long been known that some senior figures of al Shabaab (the al Qaeda-linked militant group that controls most of southern Somalia) would consider negotiating with the government. Moreover, a dialogue now could boost the unpopular TFG's image in the eyes of the Somali people who view the conflict as innately political. Indeed, for the last three years, the TFG has talked about negotiating with its principal enemy, al Shabaab, but has never put forward a serious plan for doing so, mainly because dialogue has never been as high a policy priority as a military victory.

Yet the time is riper than ever. Although it is not close to defeat, al Shabaab is back on its heels. The organization was especially hurt when AMISOM pushed it out of Bakara, the country's largest market and by far the organization's biggest generator of revenue. Recent setbacks have created a rift within the upper echelon of al Shabaab. One camp is calling for a guerilla-style war, noting the group's dwindling resources, while a rival wing is bent on continuing the head-to-head fighting, contending that it is the only a credible path to military victory. Complicating matters is al Shabaab's image problem: It has alienated the Somali people with its assassinations, attacks against innocent civilians, and poor management of last year's famine.

The process of translating the principle of negotiation into practice starts with a third party, country or organization that is willing to take the lead. Turkey and Qatar are natural candidates to help: both the TFG and some, if not many, in the insurgency view the two countries as genuine and credible mediators. Indeed, both have the capacity and the experience in mediating deadly conflicts.

So, for the first time in a while, the corrupt, unstable, and congenitally weak Somali government could enter negotiations from a position of strength. To take advantage of the opportunity, the TFG should form a National Reconciliation Commission that is backed by a legal, political, and financial mandate from the TFG and the international community. To make it work, the NRC would need individuals of considerable integrity and honesty to run it. There would be several candidates: Many within the TFG had -- and continue to maintain -- good relations with key al Shabaab figures. Other members could be drawn from the ranks of Islamic scholars, civil society leaders, and traditional elders. The NRC should be under minimal oversight by the TFG, and its members' personal safety must be guaranteed.

Even if those conditions could be satisfied, holding a dialogue with al Shabaab would undoubtedly be a complex process and require a meticulous plan for where, when, and how to engage. Audrey Cronin, a professor at the School of Public Policy at George Mason University, lays out two main approaches to dialogue. The first is to offer concessions to a rebel group by addressing some of its key demands in the hope that it reconciles with the government.

A good example is the 2008 Djibouti Agreement, which led to the formation of the current TFG. Somalia's then-transitional government granted the Alliance for Reliberation of Somalia (ARS) -- an Islamist-dominated group fighting for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces -- permission to merge with the new TFG. It also promised that Ethiopia would withdraw from the country. The insurgents took the deal, and the ARS joined the government. That pact forms the basis of the current TFG and is widely cited as a successful reconciliation model.

The second approach, according to Cronin, is to divide the rebels by winning over moderate elements and isolating extremist ones. In this case, negotiators would offer incentives -- payments, jobs, and so on -- to the groups and individuals wishing to reconcile with the government. This approach works best when applied to non-monolithic groups such as al Shabaab.

To make talks work between the TFG and al Shabaab would require using both approaches. Some of al Shabaab's demands -- a government based on Islamic values and the withdrawal of foreign forces -- are popular and have broad constituencies. In addition, the group consists of various factions with different grievances and aspirations, and many of these could be accommodated.