The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations
Significant groups in both China and the United States claim that a contest for supremacy between the two countries is inevitable and perhaps already under way. They are wrong. Beijing and Washington may not, in the end, be able to transcend the forces pushing them toward conflict. But they owe it to themselves, and the world, to try.
HENRY A. KISSINGER is Chair of Kissinger Associates and a former U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Adviser. This essay is adapted from the afterword to the forthcoming paperback edition of his latest book, On China (Penguin, 2012).
An annotated Foreign Affairs syllabus on China's economy.

In Tiananmen Square. (Ed-meister / flickr)
On January 19, 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao issued a joint statement at the end of Hu’s visit to Washington. It proclaimed their shared commitment to a “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship.” Each party reassured the other regarding his principal concern, announcing, “The United States reiterated that it welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs. China welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region.”
Since then, the two governments have set about implementing the stated objectives. Top American and Chinese officials have exchanged visits and institutionalized their exchanges on major strategic and economic issues. Military-to-military contacts have been restarted, opening an important channel of communication. And at the unofficial level, so-called track-two groups have explored possible evolutions of the U.S.-Chinese relationship.
Yet as cooperation has increased, so has controversy. Significant groups in both countries claim that a contest for supremacy between China and the United States is inevitable and perhaps already under way. In this perspective, appeals for U.S.-Chinese cooperation appear outmoded and even naive...
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