France's economic floundering has many citizens worried that their children will not have the same opportunities as they did. Unfortunately, neither Sarkozy nor Hollande are offering any reassurances.
MIRA KAMDAR is a Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute. She lives in Paris.
In the first round of voting for the French presidency, fringe candidates are expected to win an inflated share of the votes. Meanwhile, the campaigns of the two real contenders -- Sarkozy and Hollande -- are doing little more than limping along. Unfortunately, absurdist theater doesn't make for good politics.
François Hollande's victory over Nicolas Sarkozy in this weekend's presidential election seems so certain that the French press has already moved on to speculating about the legislative elections that will take place in June. In those, fringe candidates will win some victories, setting the tone for French and European politics.

Gloomy economic forecasts abound in Paris. (DomiKetu / flickr)
Divining the result of French elections is a notoriously hazardous affair. No one in France forgets 2002, when Jean-Marie Le Pen, the right-wing National Front candidate, pulled off a surprise upset in the first round, knocking Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin out of the running and securing a place in the runoff election against Jacques Chirac.
A decade later, there are no fewer than ten candidates on the ballot for the first round of voting on April 22. Polls indicate that Nicolas Sarkozy, the incumbent president, and François Hollande, the Socialist Party challenger, are in a virtual tie at 28 and 27 percent of the vote, respectively. They alone will likely go on to the runoff election on May 6. Even so, voters will still signal strong support for a trio of second-tier candidates who have positioned themselves as more or less radical alternatives to the status quo. According to a new poll by Ifop-Fiducial, a major French polling outfit, 16 percent of voters say they will vote for Marine Le Pen of the far-right National Front in the first round, 11.5 percent for François Bayrou of the centrist Democratic Movement party, and 13.5 percent for Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the far-left candidate, whose support until recently hovered in the low single digits.
These numbers reflect the unhappiness of the vast majority of French voters. France is reeling from Europe's widespread economic woes. In January, Standard and Poor's stripped the country of its AAA credit rating. France's national bureau of statistics projects no economic growth for the next 18 months. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development expects unemployment, already at a 12-year high of 9.3 percent, to reach 10.7 percent by the end of the year. France's economic floundering has many citizens worried that their children will not have the same opportunities or the same high-quality social benefits as they did during the Trente Glorieuses, the three decades of postwar prosperity that provided the French with a comfortable standard of living and a strong social safety net.
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Franco-German relations are at once much better and much worse than is generally imagined in the United States. Better, because the frigid atmosphere and tensions of 1964-1965 obscure the solidity of the links forged between France and the Federal Republic. Worse, because these tensions are not solely attributable to General de Gaulle but are the expression of a profound divergence in perspective.
The French always seem to be opposing the United States on some issue or other. They coddle Saddam Hussein and denounce American "cultural imperialism." Why is France so difficult to deal with? It is, quite simply, in a bad mood, unsure of its place and status in a new world. The French are jealous of America, which seems to run the world; afraid of globalization, which threatens to erode their culture; and ambivalent about European unification, which might drown out their voice. France must meet these challenges while struggling with a cumbersome statist economy and a rising extreme right. To do it all, France must transcend itself.
Three years after having signed a treaty of coöperation with Dr. Adenauer, designed to make the marriage of France and Germany the foundation for the regrouping of Europe, General de Gaulle has travelled to the Soviet Union to talk of rediscovered friendship, agreement and even "alliance" between the "new France" and the "new Russia." Now the latter, pending information to the contrary, is the principal adversary of the German Federal Republic, and the Soviet leaders do not hide the fact that they look upon the rapprochement with Paris as a means of gaining support against German "revanchism." We may therefore be permitted to question the degree of coherence in the foreign policy of the Fifth Republic and to wonder whether such changes of course-there are other examples-cannot be best explained by psychological factors, the first of them being excessive amour propre.
