The Right Way Out of Afghanistan
Leaving Behind a State That Can Govern
Article Summary and Author Biography
As the United States prepares to exit Afghanistan, it is focusing too much on security, overlooking the political elements of the transition, write two former senior U.S. officials. To leave behind a stable government in 2014, Washington needs to push harder for electoral reforms, negotiations with the Taliban, and a regional settlement involving Pakistan.
STEPHEN HADLEY is Senior Adviser for International Affairs at the U.S. Institute of Peace and served as National Security Adviser to U.S. President George W. Bush. JOHN D. PODESTA is Chair of the Center for American Progress and served as Chief of Staff to U.S. President Bill Clinton. In 2011, they chaired a bipartisan working group that reviewed U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, from which the findings in this essay are derived.
News & Events
The two former senior U.S. officials discuss their July/August 2012 Foreign Affairs article.
Response
Stephen Hadley and John Podesta overemphasize the speed of the transition about to take place in Afghanistan as the United States departs, argues a former U.S. ambassador. Hadley and Podesta respond, insisting that time is running out for a legitimate Afghan government to emerge.
Taking off: U.S. paratroopers in Paktika, Afghanistan, October 2009 (Andrya Hill / U.S. Army)
The signing in May of a strategic partnership agreement between the United States and Afghanistan came at a tense time in the Afghan war. As NATO and the International Security Assistance Force work to transfer security responsibility for much of the country to the Afghan government, the agreement establishes the contours of a long-term relationship and a framework for future cooperation. But it notably leaves out details on the levels of forces and funding the United States will commit to Afghanistan after 2014. Meanwhile, insurgents continue to mount frequent attacks against high-visibility targets throughout the country and have assassinated international personnel and Afghans with ties to the government of President Hamid Karzai. Trust between the U.S. and Afghan governments has eroded as a result of Afghan civilian casualties, attacks on U.S. and other international forces by Afghan troops, and blunders by U.S. military personnel, including the burning of Korans at an air base.
Although the Obama administration has reached out to the Taliban and Pakistan in the hopes of achieving a negotiated settlement, the U.S. transition strategy still prioritizes military activity over diplomacy. As Washington draws down its troops, it has armed both regular and irregular Afghan forces and targeted insurgent commanders and other extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The military campaign has had significant successes, particularly in dismantling al Qaeda and largely destroying its senior leadership in the region, achieving a primary U.S. national security objective. It has also weakened Taliban insurgents and restored Afghan government control over significant portions of southern Afghanistan.
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