For two decades, the United States has dominated the global arms trade, reaping a broad range of economic and geopolitical benefits in the process. But shortsighted decisions to produce expensive, cutting-edge weapons systems, rather than cheaper, more practical ones, are squandering this monopoly and letting other countries get into the market.
JONATHAN CAVERLEY is an Assistant Professor at Northwestern University. ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN is a Professor at the University of Texas at Austin, a Visiting Professor at Georgetown University, and a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
An essay in images about the U.S.'s fading position as arms dealer to the world.
Jonathan Caverly and Ethan Kapstein maintained that the United States’ domination of the global arms market is disappearing and that as a consequence, Washington is squandering an array of economic and political benefits. Critics dispute the point; Caverley and Kapstein respond.
Outgunned: assembling Rafale fighter jets near Bordeaux, France. Click here to view a slideshow of the fading U.S. weapons industry. (Reuters / Regis Duvignan)
Over the last two decades, the United States has enjoyed an unrivaled competitive advantage in the production and export of advanced conventional weaponry. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact led to sharp reductions in Russian defense spending and a drop in Moscow's arms transfers to regional allies. Simultaneously, globalization rewarded firms with economies of scale, allowing U.S. defense contractors to capitalize on their size and on large orders from armed forces around the globe. The formula for success was simple: by producing a range of affordable yet sophisticated weapons, the Pentagon and its contractors would crush any rivals. Domination of the global arms trade, and the economic and geopolitical benefits that came with it, was the United States' to lose.
But that advantage is fading. In the 1990s, the United States controlled 60 percent of the global weapons market. Today, it is responsible for only about 30 percent. By focusing on cutting-edge technology and developing excessively expensive defense systems, Washington has left the door open for foreign competitors to market practical weapons at an affordable cost. Consequently, Russia has resurged as an arms merchant, and a host of other countries, such as China, Israel, and South Korea, are becoming important suppliers...
This is a premium article
You must be a logged in Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you wish to continue reading this article please subscribe , or activate your online account to get full online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
The nuclear threat has been transformed since the end of the Cold War, but Washington's nuclear posture has not changed to meet it. The United States should scale back its arsenal while allowing limited nuclear tests, shaping its nuclear force to bolster nonproliferation without undermining deterrence.
The White House's radical new strategy to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction will likely make the world less secure, not more.
The long-range cruise missile has touched off an arms control debate as controversial as the one seven years ago surrounding the MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle). Although it is by no means a "superweapon" which can give its possessor a credible first-strike threat, the new cruise missile's revolutionary characteristics-particularly its accuracy, near-undetectable size, and multiplicity of firing ranges and launch platforms-threaten to undermine the basic principles underlying successful U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements to date. Thus, the cruise missile-even more than the MIRV-puts the immediate future of SALT into jeopardy.
