The latest round of fighting in Gaza gave Hamas room to paper over growing rifts between its Gaza-based leadership and its leadership in exile. But eventually the group will need to resolve internal disputes over working with Iran, working with Arab capitals, and negotiating with Israel -- or face decline.
Thanassis Cambanis is a fellow at the Century Foundation. He is a foreign policy columnist for The Boston Globe, and he blogs at thanassiscambanis.com.
Two factors pushed Hamas to ramp up its bombing campaign: belief that its strategic environment had improved in the wake of the Arab Spring and competition from Salafi groups.
Israel's operation in Gaza is meant to compel Hamas to stop shooting rockets into Israel and to better police its territory. But with Hamas unable to bend to Israeli pressure, and Israel unable to escalate or back off, it will be up to outside states to end the fighting.
With Israel and Hamas once again locked in a shooting war, it's time to think about what a more sustainable ceasefire might look like.
Senior Hamas leader Ismail Haniya delivers a speech after the conflict in Gaza. (Ahmed Zakot / Courtesy Reuters)
Once again, Hamas has been spared from making the difficult political choice that faces most resistance movements when they gain power: whether to focus on the fight or to govern. Since it won the Palestinian elections in 2006 and then took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, Hamas has been free to pursue a middle course, resisting Israel while blaming its political failures on its cold war with Fatah and on Israel's blockade. Now Hamas will tout the concessions it won from Israel last week -- as part of the ceasefire, Israel agreed to open the border crossings to Gaza, suspend its military operations there, and end targeted killings -- as proof that it should not give up fighting. Meanwhile, the outcome should be enough to buy Hamas cover for its poor record of governance and allow it to again defer making tough choices about statehood, negotiations, regional alliances, and military strategy. The group might even be able to use the momentum to supplant Fatah in the West Bank as it has done in Gaza.
Hamas' recent advance won't fully mask the organization's central dilemma, nor will it cover internal rifts about how to solve it. In the American and Israeli media, portrayals of Hamas often focus heavily on the group's commitment to eliminating the Jewish state. And certainly any fair study of the group should take into account that goal. Yet for Hamas, the end of Israel is more an ideological starting point than a practical program. And what comes after the starting point is unclear: Hamas has never developed a vision of what a resolution short of total victory might look like, nor has it spelled out an agenda for governing its own constituents, despite all these years in power. In part, that is because Hamas is a diffuse and contested movement, whose competing factions all work toward their own self-interest...
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The Dec 1987 uprising ('intifadeh') of the Palestinians is described in its military and economic aspects. It has disabused the Israelis of the idea of a liberal or enlightened occupation, but "Israel holds overwhelming military and economic advantages" and is not willing to accept a Palestinian state. For the Palestinians, it may be a long haul, in which the events of Dec 1987 may be compared to those in Dublin, in Easter 1916.
Calm has been restored to Gaza and southern Israel, but if the cease-fire is to last, Israel and the international community need to engage Hamas diplomatically. Fortunately, the organization has shown a willingness to move beyond its hardline ideology and act practically.
The rush of notable events set into motion by the uprising nearly two years ago of Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza is impressive. Two decades of near tranquility in Israel's occupied territories were shattered. The intifadeh provoked Jordan's King Hussein to relinquish his claims to the West Bank, which his grandfather had annexed in 1951. It led the Palestine Liberation Organization to declare Palestinian independence, to renounce terrorism and to accept Israel's right to exist, which in turn paved the way for the diplomatic dialogue between the United States and the PLO. Finally, in Israel, it led the Likud-Labor coalition to adopt an initiative for elections in the occupied territories for transitional self-rule to be followed by negotiations on their final status. Opponents on all sides rallied in an effort to cripple Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's initiative. These events, and more, were crammed into a short period of time, creating a sense of unparalleled passion and fluidity, of fears among some and euphoria among others.
