From a liberal democratic perspective, there is much to like in Egypt's new constitution and some things to worry about as well. There are also gaping holes and ambiguities that only politics can fill in -- and, given the current state of Egyptian democracy, that is where the real problems lie.
Secularists have taken to the streets to argue that Egypt's new constitution, likely to be ratified this week, is an illegitimate document produced in an undemocratic process. What they really fear, however, is that normal politics will soon return to the country -- setting up a fight that they know they can't win.
Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood think of themselves as uniquely qualified to rebuild Egypt. Moreover, they believe that they were entrusted with doing so during this year's election. Their miscalculation, though, was to think that the rest of Egypt felt the same way.
Soldiers stand guard outside the Egyptian presidential palace. (Asmaa Waguih / Courtesy Reuters)
It seems like déjà vu all over again in Egypt. Recent clashes between supporters of President Mohamed Morsi and those who oppose his government's draft constitution are reminiscent of the violence in the last days of former President Hosni Mubarak's reign. Both then and now, the military and police have been generally absent from the scene, standing aloof from the chaos around them. To be sure, the generals have issued statements suggesting that they might step in to restore order, but they have never made clear whether they would intervene on behalf of the protesters or Morsi. Further, on December 11, they indicated their interest in brokering a deal between the Muslim Brotherhood and the protesters, only to rescind the offer shortly thereafter.
Some have argued that the military's apparent neutrality is a reflection of its diminished power. The June 2012 election that brought Morsi to office, the argument goes, clipped the military's wings, forcing the soldiers back to their barracks. Specifically, Morsi's sacking of the most senior general in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces last August was taken as proof. Yet Morsi's move was not solely Machiavellian. In fact, according to Egypt's deputy defense minister, General Mohamed el-Assar, Morsi coordinated his plan with the SCAF's junior members. The gambit thus revealed the beginnings of an alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the armed forces...