Japan's recent territorial tussles with China and South Korea and the election of the conservative Shinzo Abe as prime minister have the world worrying that the country is taking a hawkish turn. In practice, however, Tokyo's new government will toe a moderate line and concentrate on strengthening its diplomatic ties.
J. BERKSHIRE MILLER is a Fellow on Japan at the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Pacific Forum. TAKASHI YOKOTA is Editor in Chief of Newsweek Japan and Newsweek’s correspondent in Tokyo.
Until recently, Asian countries' competing claims in the seas around China did not cause outright conflict. But now that drilling technology can tap gas and oil beds there, Asia capitals are stepping up their games.
With the recent deal to sell F-35 fighter jets to Japan, the United States has bulked up its main regional ally against China while still cutting its own defense budget by a planned $487 billion.
Recent rhetoric signals that the Japanese government is taking a tough stance on foreign policy. In reality, however, politicians and citizens alike are easily distracted by sideshows and seemingly incapable of crafting a cohesive defense strategy. When it comes to national security, Japan is its own worst enemy.
Japanese destroyer during a naval fleet review. (Yuriko Nakao / Courtesy Reuters)
Over the past year, as Japan has engaged in ugly territorial tussles with China and South Korea, outside observers have fretted about the country's shift to the right. That trend seemed to be confirmed by the election of the conservative Shinzo Abe, who returned to office as prime minister last December, having previously served in that role in 2006-7. Given Abe's hawkish statements on the campaign trail, some concluded that his return to power meant that Japan would suddenly turn the page on the pacifist strategy it has pursued since World War II, charting a more muscular and nationalistic course. The Economist boldly asserted that Abe's "scarily right-wing" cabinet is full of "radical nationalists," which "bodes ill for the region." According to this narrative, Tokyo will look to further contain China and North Korea and take a tougher diplomatic stance with South Korea and Russia.
This argument is based on several shaky pillars. First is the fear that Abe's government is revising Japan's treatment of its wartime history, signaling a newly confrontational posture. China and South Korea are concerned that Abe will continue, in spite of their protests, to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, a memorial to Japan's war dead, including those from World War II. (Abe last visited the shrine last October, as leader of the opposition.) Whether the perception is accurate or not, Yasukuni remains a symbol to South Korea and China that Japan is not interested in coming to grips with its expansionist past. Seoul and Beijing further fear that Abe will repudiate or amend the Murayama and Kono statements -- official apologies that previous Japanese administrations made for the actions of the Japanese Imperial Army before and during World War II...
