A small country hemmed in on its land borders by adversaries, Israel has always relied on the Mediterranean to avoid commercial and political isolation. New developments at sea, including the discovery of natural gas deposits and the growth of illicit trade, will only increase the importance of maritime issues for the country. Israel needs a comprehensive maritime strategy.
EHUD EIRAN is Assistant Professor in the School of Political Science at the University of Haifa. He previously served as Assistant to the Foreign Policy Adviser to Israel's Prime Minister.
YUVAL ZUR is Principal of the Maritime Strategy Chair at the University of Haifa. Previously, he was Commander of Israel's Submarine Flotilla, Vice Chief for Naval Operations, and Chief of Staff of the Israeli Navy. After retiring as an admiral, he served as Deputy Director General of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission.
Exploratory drilling near the coasts of Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey has unearthed vast reserves of natural gas. Competition over the rights to tap those resources is compounding existing tensions over sovereignty and maritime borders. The eastern Mediterranean is quickly becoming as volatile as its eastern cousin, the South China Sea.
An Israeli army helicopter and navy ships take part in Israel's 62nd Independence Day celebrations in Tel Aviv, April 2010. (Courtesy Reuters / Nir Elias)
Ever since Israel first faced the trauma of a ground invasion by its Arab neighbors in 1948, its military planners and strategists have focused chiefly on land-based threats. The country's armed forces and security doctrine were designed to deter such attacks or bring them to a swift end should they occur. And as expected, the wars that Israel has fought since its birth have been mostly ground-based.
To this day, Israel’s maritime strategy remains largely an afterthought. For many years, Israel’s navy has been the country’s least visible military service. The country’s most recent effort to craft a new national security strategy, in 2006, did not include a significant maritime component. As a result, Israel has no comprehensive vision, goals, or policy for maritime and naval issues.
This is a problem. As a small country hemmed in by adversaries on all of its land borders, Israel should realize that its security and economic prosperity are intrinsically and directly linked to the open seas. Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, understood that well. "Anyone who understands our geographic reality and its economic and political implications,” he said in a 1950 speech, “will immediately grasp the value of our sea power for our existence."
Ben-Gurion and his predecessors did not heed these words of wisdom, which are even more apt today. For starters, the great bulk of Israel’s export and import cargo -- 98 percent in 2011 -- leaves or enters the country through the Mediterranean Sea. Underwater cables transmit almost all of Israel's communications to the world. And with an increasingly hostile Iran channeling weapons through the sea to Israel’s adversaries, it is imperative that Israel devote more attention to its naval strategy and forces...
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Exploratory drilling near the coasts of Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey has unearthed vast reserves of natural gas. Competition over the rights to tap those resources is compounding existing tensions over sovereignty and maritime borders. The eastern Mediterranean is quickly becoming as volatile as its eastern cousin, the South China Sea.
From history, climate, the cultivation of the olive and other aspects of a common civilization, the Mediterranean region has a certain unity. One can see it on the map. Yet it is too much a part of Europe, too much a part of the larger strategic concerns of non-Mediterranean powers, too diverse in the nations which encircle its waters, to constitute a subject of specifically regional politics, economics or security. A Tunisian foreign minister may call plaintively for a Mediterranean freed from the presence of superpower navies. A Soviet leader may float a suggestion for its denuclearization. A Yugoslav may propose a system of Mediterranean security to complete the work of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. A president of France may speak of a community stemming from his nation's historic and cultural ties with nations on both sides of the inland sea. Such proposals have had an occasional echo. But the Mediterranean area is not ready for a big international conference on security, for a negotiated set of principles of coexistence, or for the withdrawal of American and Soviet naval forces. Everyone sees a crisis there, but none agree on its description and no regional solution, no regional procedure for getting a solution, is at hand.
AFTER more than four years' absence from political life, Mr. Venizelos on July 4 of last year became Prime Minister of Greece for the fifth time, and in the subsequent General Election obtained such an overwhelming victory that he became the constitutional dictator of his country. Only fifteen Royalists, including only one Royalist leader, Mr. Tsaldares, were elected, and even such a Royalist stronghold as the Peloponnese returned Venizelist deputies.
