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The United States' Real Leverage on Iran
Between 1990 and 2003, former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein confronted the twentieth century’s most devastating economic sanctions. In theory, he could have won relief by fully cooperating with United Nations weapons inspectors on his country’s WMD program, yet he refused to do so until the bitter end. In reality, he had no reason to give in; he believed that the United States would block the lifting of sanctions as long as he remained in power. And, despite those crippling sanctions, he hung on to power until deposed in 2003 by U.S. military forces.
Opponents of the recent interim nuclear agreement with Iran seem to think that, somehow, this time would be different. They argue that the sanctions are working and that further tightening the squeeze would force Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, perhaps by fomenting regime change. But there is no evidence in the past 100 years of sanctions history to support that premise. In 204 episodes that colleagues at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and I studied, only three were deemed fully successful when the issues at stake involved core national interests on both sides -- for instance, preventing Taiwan and Korea from developing nuclear weapon capabilities, which the United States accomplished by threatening sanctions in the 1970s. And, as I recently wrote, in all three of those cases, the target of the sanctions was heavily dependent, both economically and for security guarantees, on the sanctioning country.