Canada and the United States in World Politics
About a decade ago a Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs created a furor on both sides of the border by saying that "the days of relatively easy and automatic political relations with our neighbors are, I think, over." Nourished for years, as we all had been, on post-prandial pap about the unfortified frontier and the capacity of North American good will to mellow away all differences, Americans and Canadians were unduly shocked. They disregarded the fact that Mr. Pearson had not said relations were deteriorating; he merely said they had become more complex. They had become more complex be cause they were no longer a simple matter of line- fence disputes over borders and waterways. We had both ceased isolating ourselves from the troubles of the world and, for that reason, we were likely to have differences on a great many more subjects than in the past. Mr. Pearson aimed to persuade people on both sides of the border to adopt an adult attitude to our relations, to abandon the persistent North American illusion that good will without understanding was adequate and that problems could be smiled away in intercommunity singing, to recognize that any two countries in close proximity were bound to go on having disputes and differences and that the mark of intelligence was not to pretend they did not exist but to approach them tolerantly, judiciously, and unemotionally-and, in a sense, to take them for granted.
About a decade ago a Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs created a furor on both sides of the border by saying that "the days of relatively easy and automatic political relations with our neighbors are, I think, over." Nourished for years, as we all had been, on post-prandial pap about the unfortified frontier and the capacity of North American good will to mellow away all differences, Americans and Canadians were unduly shocked. They disregarded the fact that Mr. Pearson had not said relations were deteriorating; he merely said they had become more complex. They had become more complex be cause they were no longer a simple matter of line- fence disputes over borders and waterways. We had both ceased isolating ourselves from the troubles of the world and, for that reason, we were likely to have differences on a great many more subjects than in the past. Mr. Pearson aimed to persuade people on both sides of the border to adopt an adult attitude to our relations, to abandon the persistent North American illusion that good will without understanding was adequate and that problems could be smiled away in intercommunity singing, to recognize that any two countries in close proximity were bound to go on having disputes and differences and that the mark of intelligence was not to pretend they did not exist but to approach them tolerantly, judiciously, and unemotionally-and, in a sense, to take them for granted.
The truth of Mr. Pearson's prediction has been demonstrated by the history of the past ten years. The sense of partnership and common purpose between the United States and Canada is, I think, stronger than it ever was. Nevertheless, we argue about a lot more things than we used to because there are many more things to argue about. Our most acute differences are as likely to be about distant places-China, Cuba or Laos-as about tariffs and waterways. There is, in fact, an edge to these arguments about faraway places which make them more of a threat to good relations than are our traditional controversies. Perhaps we have come to take for granted disputes about trade, farm surpluses and drainage canals, recognizing that a state of litigation between neighbors is normal and perpetual. When a question of common policies toward the rest of the world is involved, however, the perspective is confused. On the one side there are complaints about "disloyalty" and on the other side grumblings about "arrogance."
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Relations between Canada and the United States have become more strained than at any time in recent memory. There have been many earlier periods of tension, but the policy orientations of the two capitals in late 1981 appear to be far more divergent than in the past. The two governments seem to be on a collision course, in a context that political leaders cannot fully control.
Canadians like to remind their more turbulent friends that they have grown by evolution rather than revolution. In the language of the country, therefore, the present might be described as a pre-evolutionary phase. The change of Government from Conservative to Liberal in April may usher in changes, but politics are only the surface manifestation of a crisis which involves the whole fabric of national life. For several years there has been an intense examination of Canada's economic, constitutional and cultural foundations, conducted in a charged political atmosphere, by no means entirely rational, but a grand debate nevertheless. Canadians have been staring with less blinking than usual at the harder facts, even asking themselves whether the continued existence of the country is justified. They have been stung by criticism from abroad which reached beyond the acts of the Government to question Canadian institutions and traditions- criticism which was unqualified by the benevolent indulgence to which nicely behaved lesser powers have become accustomed. Canada has perhaps suffered too long from the illusion that it is a young country with the license of youth in world affairs, and its course may be firmer as Canadians realize that they are not only middle-powered but middle-aged. The sobriety which has followed a tumultuous election, with the world for the first time looking on, is a mood in which fundamental changes can be accepted. On the eve of the hundredth anniversary of confederation, Canadians in anguish have been discovering its worth and seem disposed to meet present challenges with restored faith-if only they and their leaders can work out some answers.
NATO's poorly planned adventure in Kosovo has brought a critical question to the fore: just how should Americans define their national interest in the information age? The Soviet Union is gone, and an information revolution has transformed the nature of power. Few "A list" threats to American security loom large today. Global telecommunications have made humanitarian crises in far-flung places impossible to ignore. But before the United States embarks on another costly human rights crusade, Americans should recognize that moral values are only part of a foreign policy. Other essential priorities remain. If Washington neglects to handle the "A list," the consequences for global peace and prosperity will be dire.

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