Albania and the Sino-Soviet Conflict
The conflict between little Albania and the Soviet Union is today at the center of the Soviet-Chinese rift. This first became apparent at the Bucharest Congress of June 1960, when of all the heads of Communist Parties of Eastern Europe only Enver Hoxha was absent. However, the clash between the two countries had been proceeding undercover for a long time. To understand its roots, let us first turn to Albanian-Jugoslav relations.
The conflict between little Albania and the Soviet Union is today at the center of the Soviet-Chinese rift. This first became apparent at the Bucharest Congress of June 1960, when of all the heads of Communist Parties of Eastern Europe only Enver Hoxha was absent. However, the clash between the two countries had been proceeding undercover for a long time. To understand its roots, let us first turn to Albanian-Jugoslav relations.
Contrary to what has recently been published in some American newspapers, the Albanian Communist Party was founded and organized in November 1941 by the Jugoslav Communist Party. It was brought under the control of the latter during the war, and there it remained until the Tito-Cominform break in 1948. When the Albanian Communist Party was freed from the Jugoslav grip, it began attacking Tito and the Jugoslav leaders as "deviationists" and "traitors." This continued up to Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade in June 1955. The Soviet leader's efforts to reëstablish friendly relations with Jugoslavia acutely disturbed the Albanian Communists. They feared that this might lead to a restoration of Jugoslav control in Albania, endangering not only their positions but perhaps also their lives. They moderated their attacks, but were cautious in expressing satisfaction at the reconciliation.
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The long-heralded and twice-postponed conference between the Chinese and Soviet Communist spokesmen, held at Moscow in July, was overshadowed, at least for the outside world, by the dramatic publication of the exchange of letters between the two Central Committees. The breakup of the conference was hardly softened by halfhearted assertions of a mutual intention to continue the discussions. It is hard to discern any useful topics for new negotiations until one or another or both parties to the quarrel have made some rather drastic changes in their ideological claims or their practical policy aims. The two facets are inseparable, of course. Quarrels among Communists have been a recurring feature of a movement that claims political omniscience and a monopoly of messianic foresight, and are normally clothed in recondite scholastic terms. But their ideological disputes are always waged over real questions of power and policy.
In the past, when a bitter quarrel broke out between neighboring nations, rival territorial claims were often the underlying cause. France and Germany remained hostile to each other for a long period over the question of Alsace and Lorraine; the slogan "Italia Irredenta" so embittered the relations between Italy and Austria that the residue of this feeling contributes to the present unrest in the Italian Tyrol. China's conflict with her great southern neighbor, India, along the disputed Himalayan boundary seems to conform to the classic pattern of territorial disputes (although the Indians do not altogether agree).
Since the dramatic developments at the Twenty-second Soviet Party Congress last year, no one can seriously doubt the existence of a profound dispute between Russia and China. But opinions vary widely as to its causes, its likely future development, its consequences and its significance, if any, for Western policy. My purpose is to provide a framework for exploring the implications of the Sino-Soviet dispute for the West.
