Time and time again during the past fifteen years our people have had to confront a new Berlin crisis. Thus they are well aware that we have a continuing Berlin problem. However, it is not always recognized that the critical Berlin situation which has prevailed since the end of World War II is in reality a challenge to the survival of Europe. Many of us have forgotten why and when the Berlin problem came about. For a proper understanding of it and of its relationship to our foreign policy, we must look back occasionally to find how it did develop.
Time and time again during the past fifteen years our people have had to confront a new Berlin crisis. Thus they are well aware that we have a continuing Berlin problem. However, it is not always recognized that the critical Berlin situation which has prevailed since the end of World War II is in reality a challenge to the survival of Europe. Many of us have forgotten why and when the Berlin problem came about. For a proper understanding of it and of its relationship to our foreign policy, we must look back occasionally to find how it did develop.
In the fall of 1943 when President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met in Quebec, the Soviet armies had stopped the German offensive and were advancing doggedly toward Central Europe. The British representatives at Quebec were already concerned as to where and when the Western Allied armies would meet the Soviet armies. They urged that an early conference be arranged with the Soviet Government to fix the lines of demarcation between these armies and to draw an agreement for the occupation of a defeated Germany. As a result, this question was placed on the agenda for the meeting of foreign ministers in Moscow in October 1943. There it was agreed that a European Advisory Commission would immediately be established in London to negotiate agreements for the future zones of occupation and for the postwar treatment of occupied Germany. This Commission was composed of the United States and Soviet ambassadors to Great Britain and a representative of the British Foreign Office, Sir William Strang...
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I write this article not long after my visit to France, where I spent seven eventful days of great political importance. One essential purpose of my visit was to demonstrate to the German and French peoples and, indeed, to the whole world that the reconciliation between the two neighboring peoples on both sides of the Rhine has now become a reality.
Where does West Germany stand in the Great Debate about the future shape of the Atlantic Alliance? Are the "Atlanticists," represented by Chancellor Erhard and his Foreign Minister Schröder, really on the wane? Is the "Euro- Gaullist" school of thought, led by former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, former Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauss and Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg, in the ascendancy?
In Germany as in France, 1969 will be remembered as the year of the break in continuity. The principal break is in each case obvious: the departure of General de Gaulle after eleven years in power and the relegation of the Christian Democrats to the opposition after twenty years in power. But the nature and import of these breaks call for interpretation.

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