I Write this article not long after my visit to France, where I spent seven eventful days of great political importance. One essential purpose of my visit was to demonstrate to the German and French peoples and, indeed, to the whole world that the reconciliation between the two neighboring peoples on both sides of the Rhine has now become a reality.
I Write this article not long after my visit to France, where I spent seven eventful days of great political importance. One essential purpose of my visit was to demonstrate to the German and French peoples and, indeed, to the whole world that the reconciliation between the two neighboring peoples on both sides of the Rhine has now become a reality.
President de Gaulle called it a "miracle." And indeed, ten years ago very few people would have dared to hope that the two nations, which fought one another for centuries, would extend the hand of friendship so soon after a terrible war in order jointly to tackle the tasks before them. The solidarity now existing between France and Germany is the result of long and courageous efforts on both sides. On the French side the work was begun by Robert Schuman; with great prudence and energy President de Gaulle has brought it to its conclusion and, I may say, to its crowning glory. The extraordinary characteristic of this development, however, lies in the fact that broad sections of both peoples seized upon the idea and supported the efforts of their governments. The ever-increasing friendliness and open- mindedness with which the French everywhere welcomed the German Federal Chancellor from Paris via Rouen and Bordeaux up to Reims have shown the broad basis on which Franco-German solidarity now rests.
Germany and France have become aware of what they have in common-their histories, their interests and their responsibilities. From now on they will be still closer together. The feeling of solidarity will be embedded still deeper in the conscience of the nations and will one day be natural to all. President de Gaulle is visiting the Federal Republic this autumn, and by the time my words are printed, the German people will have shown him how dearly they cherish the friendship with France. This friendship is directed against no one in the free world; it will be to the advantage of all. Europe can only benefit if the two neighboring countries in the heart of Europe are closely united. France and Germany will form a firm political dam against the advance of Soviet Communism which threatens the freedom of us all.
II
Franco-German solidarity is also the foundation for the edifice of European unification. The policy of European union is in an important stage of development.
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FOR five years between 1925 and 1929, a certain portion of mankind, like those parched travelers in the desert who think they have glimpsed the oasis which will save them, believed the gate to lasting peace was at hand. This, as we now know, was only a mirage. But such a mirage had never before existed. People had never believed so fervently in the blessings of peace, or hoped so passionately that peace would be perpetual. Optimism rose to new heights. "Away with cannon and machineguns: instead, conciliation, arbitration, and peace!" At the meeting of the League of Nations on September 10, 1926, when Germany, recently defeated, was received as a member, the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand touched a new intensity of emotion with these celebrated words.
In Germany as in France, 1969 will be remembered as the year of the break in continuity. The principal break is in each case obvious: the departure of General de Gaulle after eleven years in power and the relegation of the Christian Democrats to the opposition after twenty years in power. But the nature and import of these breaks call for interpretation.
Franco-GERMAN relations are at once much better and much worse than is generally imagined in the United States. Better, because the frigid atmosphere and tensions of 1964-1965 obscure the solidity of the links forged between France and the Federal Republic. Worse, because these tensions are not solely attributable to General de Gaulle but are the expression of a profound divergence in perspective.
