In 1963 the United States can renegotiate her alliance with Spain. If neither party were to raise new conditions, the ten-year-old alliance would be automatically extended, to last another ten years. However, General Franco has already hinted that he wants to bargain for further military aid. The political structure of the country with which the U.S. Government is now probably preparing to confirm its friendship is at an especially interesting stage.
In 1963 the United States can renegotiate her alliance with Spain. If neither party were to raise new conditions, the ten-year-old alliance would be automatically extended, to last another ten years. However, General Franco has already hinted that he wants to bargain for further military aid. The political structure of the country with which the U.S. Government is now probably preparing to confirm its friendship is at an especially interesting stage.
The National Movement, the Falange Española Tradicionalista de las JONS, is even less of a party than most single parties in authoritarian states. It derives from General Franco's clever amalgamation of the Carlists (Tradicionalistas) and the semi-Fascists of the Falange who were his main non-military supporters in the civil war. The most fervent Carlists and Falangists were either expelled or kept outside, and today the few radical Falangists (of whom the most extreme is the small hectic group known as "Young Nation") are nearly as critical of General Franco as is any Socialist. The Falange proper is really no more than the bureaucracy which staffs the ministries and the various organizations, including old soldiers who make use of the Falange ideology to gather some popular appeal. This ideology is partly simply emotive-making use of the phrases of the epoch of the civil war such as "crusade of liberation"-and partly based on the radical aspirations of the ambivalent founder of the Falange, José Antonio Prime de Rivera; but most of the original Falangists remaining-possibly as many as 60 percent of the pre-civil-war members were killed between 1936 and 1939-have settled down as rniddle-aged businessmen, profiting from the recent industrial successes or from the more long-standing profiteering.
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The importance of southern Europe to the balance of power in world affairs has been underlined by the continuing crisis in the Middle East, the growth of Russian power in the Mediterranean and President Nixon's diplomatic journey in the autumn of 1970. The earlier renewal of the Spanish-American military pact, followed by Nixon's visit to Madrid, once more called attention to the role played by the Spanish government. At the same time, the future of the Franco régime has raised more questions than at any time in the past two decades, if only because of the fact that Franco himself entered his seventy-ninth year at the close of 1970 and in the preceding year took the unprecedented step of officially designating a successor, Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón, as heir to the Spanish throne.
The Polish elections may signal the dawning of a political force in Central and Eastern Europe-Christian democracy, with emphasis on both words.
The awesome floods of November aside, Italy in late 1966 was in a state of non-crisis. There has been enough political and economic instability in the past, however, to make us view this period of often frenetic progress toward industrialization and social unity as temporary. Fundamental social changes are in process. The business recession of 1964 seems a thing of the past. A government budget of $14.3 billion for 1967 has been prepared, including $1.4 billion for much-needed agricultural development during the next five years and another $600 million for the still depressed southern regions. After hesitant beginnings in February, the third coalition center- left government of the taciturn Christian Democratic premier, Aldo Moro, appears to be settling in with a minimum of open controversy for the period between now and the general elections in 1968. The strains among the basically mismated members of his cabinet are temporarily eased while the two major elements (Christian Democrats and Socialists) reform for the campaign to win the adherence of more than 32,000,000 voters. In foreign policy, reflecting as it does the gentler phase of the cold war, no initiatives are likely. None the less, there is much for Italy's politicians to do.

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