Moscow, Peking and the Communist Parties of Asia
Never before have we seen such an extraordinary display of disunity in the Communist world. Moscow's policy of rapprochement with Tito is regarded by Peking and its supporters as further proof of the fundamentally revisionist, anti-Marxian character of "the Khrushchev group." Peking views the indecisive Soviet policy regarding the Sino-Indian conflict-Moscow's precarious attempt to carry water on both shoulders-as a typical failure of Khrushchev to give full support to a "fraternal socialist ally." It brands the Soviet decision to withdraw missiles from Cuba as appeasement of American imperialism, a clear manifestation of the pacifism and fear that it now regularly describes as the trademarks of Russian diplomacy.
Never before have we seen such an extraordinary display of disunity in the Communist world. Moscow's policy of rapprochement with Tito is regarded by Peking and its supporters as further proof of the fundamentally revisionist, anti-Marxian character of "the Khrushchev group." Peking views the indecisive Soviet policy regarding the Sino-Indian conflict-Moscow's precarious attempt to carry water on both shoulders-as a typical failure of Khrushchev to give full support to a "fraternal socialist ally." It brands the Soviet decision to withdraw missiles from Cuba as appeasement of American imperialism, a clear manifestation of the pacifism and fear that it now regularly describes as the trademarks of Russian diplomacy.
The Soviet Premier and his friends have answers to these charges. To them, the foremost enemies of Marx-Leninism at present are dogmatists who pursue a narrow nationalism, emulate Stalinism in its worst aspects and follow adventurist policies that risk global war. In Khrushchevian circles, the tendency is growing to divide the Communist world into its "advanced" and "backward" components, into categories of "friendly" and "unfriendly" socialist states or factions.
Clearly, the strenuous efforts of Communist intermediaries during recent months to bring about some understanding-or at least a modus vivendi- between Russia and China have borne little fruit. Thus the events that followed immediately after the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.) acquire additional significance. For five months after October 1961 the Communist bloc quarreled publicly among themselves before the world. The era of open struggle was inaugurated when Chou En-lai departed from Moscow in a huff at the height of the Congress, having earlier left a wreath on the tomb of that "great Marxist-Leninist," J. V. Stalin, and having upbraided Khrushchev in stinging fashion for his public criticism of Albania. There followed the steady development of the Sino-Al- banian alliance in the face of withering Soviet blasts against Albanian leaders and the severance of Russian-Albanian diplomatic relations. And throughout this period, although the Soviet Union and its allies repeatedly proclaimed that their position had the support of "the overwhelming majority" of the Communist parties of the world, most Asian Communist parties firmly refused to give Moscow their support on the crucial issues.
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In ten short years since Joseph Stalin's death a once potent revolutionary force has disintegrated into two mutually hostile phalanxes linked only by ritualistic proclamations of unity: an orthodox international Communism headed by Mao Tse-tung, and a revisionist international Communism led by Nikita Khrushchev. There is no coöperation between the Soviet and the Chinese leaders; no collaboration in actual policies; no coördination of a general outlook. The alliance as an active political force is dead.
Since the dramatic developments at the Twenty-second Soviet Party Congress last year, no one can seriously doubt the existence of a profound dispute between Russia and China. But opinions vary widely as to its causes, its likely future development, its consequences and its significance, if any, for Western policy. My purpose is to provide a framework for exploring the implications of the Sino-Soviet dispute for the West.
The long-heralded and twice-postponed conference between the Chinese and Soviet Communist spokesmen, held at Moscow in July, was overshadowed, at least for the outside world, by the dramatic publication of the exchange of letters between the two Central Committees. The breakup of the conference was hardly softened by halfhearted assertions of a mutual intention to continue the discussions. It is hard to discern any useful topics for new negotiations until one or another or both parties to the quarrel have made some rather drastic changes in their ideological claims or their practical policy aims. The two facets are inseparable, of course. Quarrels among Communists have been a recurring feature of a movement that claims political omniscience and a monopoly of messianic foresight, and are normally clothed in recondite scholastic terms. But their ideological disputes are always waged over real questions of power and policy.
