How important international trade is for the less developed nations is indicated by the fact that it frequently accounts for 20 percent or more of their total economy as against 8 percent for the economy of the United States. Indeed, trade is much more important to them than aid. Total exports of the less developed areas amounted to $31 billion in 1960, while the total flow of financial assistance from the industrial nations (including private foreign investment) amounted to $8 billion.
How important international trade is for the less developed nations is indicated by the fact that it frequently accounts for 20 percent or more of their total economy as against 8 percent for the economy of the United States. Indeed, trade is much more important to them than aid. Total exports of the less developed areas amounted to $31 billion in 1960, while the total flow of financial assistance from the industrial nations (including private foreign investment) amounted to $8 billion.
Despite these facts, very little is being done either within the less developed nations or through various aid programs to encourage their exports. Indeed, there is a disturbing trend toward policies which actively work in the opposite direction. The failure to stress the importance of international trade is serious, since unless these nations can expand it they cannot achieve their aspirations for accelerated development and for a rapid growth in living standards.
Consequently, it is pertinent to: (1) review the role which exports have played in the development process; (2) examine critically the argument that a developing nation should now concentrate its efforts on local industrialization and play down its traditional trade in food and industrial raw materials; and (3) consider what could be done through commodity agreements or other policies to promote exports from the less developed nations.
In recent years there has been a significant change in the composition of the trade between the industrial and less developed nations. The traditional pattern, and the dominant one until the end of World War II, involved an exchange of primary products (food and industrial raw materials) from the less developed nations for manufactured consumer products from the industrial nations. The United Kingdom, many continental European nations and Japan supported their industrial development by trading textiles, flour, shoes and other consumer products for such primary products as cotton, cocoa, sugar, hides, copper and jute. In such a trading system, it was difficult for local manufacturing to get under way in the less developed nations, though a start was made in the 1920s and 1930s.
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Only a few years ago pundits were sure that the United States was losing to Asia and Europe and had to emulate their more state- directed economies to remain competitive. Now the conventional wisdom is that America is number one and that the rest of the world should adopt its more laissez-faire approach. In fact, neither caricature is right. Asia was booming and now it is slumping, but it will be back. Europe's underlying ossification will persist. But most important, while the U.S. economy is in a period of robust growth, nothing fundamental has changed. Its long-run growth rate has not accelerated, productivity has not risen, and the structural unemployment rate has fallen by one percentage point at most. Come the next recession, all this triumphalism will seem silly.
Future historians may well mark the mid-1980s as the time when Japan surpassed the United States to become the world's dominant economic power. Japan achieved superior industrial competitiveness several years earlier, but by the mid-1980s its high-technology exports to the United States far exceeded imports, and annual trade surpluses approached $50 billion a year. Meanwhile, America's trade deficits mushroomed to $150 billion a year. By late 1985, Japan's international lending already exceeded $640 billion, about ten percent more than America's, and it is growing rapidly. By 1986 the United States became the world's largest debtor nation and Japan surpassed the United States and Saudi Arabia to become the world's largest creditor.
America's economy is in its eighth year of sustained growth, transcending the German and Japanese "miracles." This is no fluke. America's unique brand of entrepreneurial capitalism is based on a series of advantages that explain the stunning success of the 1990s and provide the basis for extending this winning streak. These strengths include deft managers, technological innovation, and a culture that values rugged individualism -- all fueled by finance capital that can nimbly meet the needs of a globalized, rapidly changing economy. Furthermore, the era of the deficit is over. Pessimists who warn of inflation should be ignored; American business leaders understand that today's low level of inflation is self-perpetuating. America's prosperity is structural, not transient, and its lead over Europe and Asia will only widen with time. America had the twentieth century. It will also have the twenty-first.
