Atlantic Relationships and Nuclear Problems
Article Summary and Author Biography
IF we look back at the year 1962 to see how it affected relations between the Atlantic powers, we find emphasis on a search for ways to put into more effective practice the spirit of partnership called for by President Kennedy in his speech of July 4. In this search, the obstacle over which both statesmen and writers have stumbled has nearly always been connected with nuclear problems and specifically with the sharing of responsibilities for the control and use of nuclear weapons.
A FRENCH VIEW
IF we look back at the year 1962 to see how it affected relations between the Atlantic powers, we find emphasis on a search for ways to put into more effective practice the spirit of partnership called for by President Kennedy in his speech of July 4. In this search, the obstacle over which both statesmen and writers have stumbled has nearly always been connected with nuclear problems and specifically with the sharing of responsibilities for the control and use of nuclear weapons.
Of the various attempts to find practical solutions to these problems, the two particularly worth mentioning are the offer of the United States to commit several Polaris submarines to the NATO Command and the proposals made at the Bahamas meeting. In the course of the past year, too, the doctrine that inspires United States policy has been more sharply defined than ever before-at President Kennedy's press conference of December 18, in Mr. McNamara's statements at the Athens meeting of NATO and at Ann Arbor, and in Mr. McGeorge Bundy's address to the Atlantic Treaty Association on September 27 at Copenhagen-all of them official statements containing official proposals. It would be impossible to list all the articles by private individuals who have dealt with the subject in the course of this year. For example, the first three articles of the January 1963 issue of Foreign Affairs were concerned with just this question-how to deal with nuclear problems in order to improve the Atlantic partnership.
It is always difficult to summarize without running the risk of distorting. However, it is probably fair to say that the United States Government sees no need for national nuclear forces in Europe and that it believes there is a danger of such forces being used in case of war in a way that might precipitate rather than ward off a nuclear catastrophe. Yet it recognizes two facts: namely, that two European nations have embarked on the national production of atomic weapons; and that there is a growing desire in Europe to share in the responsibility for deciding whether such weapons should be used or not. In consequence, it is felt that the United States could support the building of a multilateral nuclear force fully integrated into the American force, and that it could help in the procurement of national delivery systems under certain conditions.[i]
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