Mr. Harold Wilson has been leader of the Labor Party for nearly a year; in 1964 he may well become Britain's first Socialist Prime Minister in 13 years. Around his aims and methods, and in particular his expressed belief in the possibility of a new society created by technological as much as by political change, have gathered much speculation and comment. However, he is by nature cautious, anxious to nourish growing party aspirations rather than initiate controversial debate, and therefore unlikely to be hasty in making innovations in either domestic or foreign policies. It is the latter which will be considered here.
Mr. Harold Wilson has been leader of the Labor Party for nearly a year; in 1964 he may well become Britain's first Socialist Prime Minister in 13 years. Around his aims and methods, and in particular his expressed belief in the possibility of a new society created by technological as much as by political change, have gathered much speculation and comment. However, he is by nature cautious, anxious to nourish growing party aspirations rather than initiate controversial debate, and therefore unlikely to be hasty in making innovations in either domestic or foreign policies. It is the latter which will be considered here.
About foreign policy Mr. Wilson speaks publicly in acceptable generalities; in private he is more specific, but a consistent thread of intention, should he become Prime Minister, is hard to discern. More than most, he has pondered the ten-year strife which rent the Labor Party from 1951 to 1961. He has put a guard upon his tongue. The 1962 annual conference was notable for a virtual absence of debate about foreign affairs and defense, and Herr Willy Brandt's appearance early in the proceedings was symbolic rather than significant.
The initial 18 months of Labor in office will be mainly a bridgehead. Of more interest are the objectives Mr. Wilson wishes to achieve and the arguments he may use to justify them once the initial period is over and the first major ministerial reshuffles are made. They are already made on paper. Mr. Wilson will be occupied at first with neither measures nor men, but with machinery. As a wartime civil servant and former political head of one of Whitehall's largest departments-the Board of Trade-he regards economic administration as the necessary precursor of more radical change. Whether or not he intends to reorganize the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defense, effectively supplanting them with an enlarged Cabinet office staffed from outside the civil service and operating a modern apparatus of policy-making, remains a matter of carefully concealed doubt.
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In 1962 the European enthusiasts in Brussels were explaining regretfully that although British membership would slow down the process of European integration-perhaps severely impede the whole movement toward a United States of Europe-it was a price that had to be paid for widening the geographical spread of the Community. No doubt these people, while regretting the manner of General de Gaulle's rupture of negotiations with Britain, are now privately relieved that the price will not have to be paid. Their view is that Britain's inherent weakness is such that she will be compelled sooner or later to come back and knock on the door again and plead for entry into the European Economic Community (E.E.C.). On the whole, better later than sooner. The European Community will by then have consolidated itself; it will be able to impose its terms with less difficulty and, in fairness it should be added, will be less niggling about making small concessions which may contravene the letter, though not the spirit, of the Treaty of Rome.
If, as the Labor Party hopes and expects, Britain will soon have its first Socialist Government since 1951, it may be of interest to know Labor's attitude to the Common Market-our attitude to the past negotiations which were suddenly ended by General de Gaulle's notorious press conference, as well as our attitude to the possibility of negotiations after the next general election.
The devaluation of the pound sterling on November 18, 1967, and the announcement on January 16, 1968, of a firm timetable for Britain's withdrawal east of Suez have been widely lamented as marking the "end of an era." Along with such spectacular domestic reversals as the imposition of charges for medical care and the promise of still heavier taxation, the events of the past several months may at least justify the clichés, so often repeated, that Britain is at a "turning point" or has reached a "crossroads." But does all of this necessarily mean continuing deterioration or indicate that Britain's economic base can no longer support her as a major power? Or can those of us looking on from outside reasonably hope that what Labor Ministers have called the "second Battle of Britain,"1 will result in new patterns of economic expansion?
