Premier Khrushchev's trip to Egypt marks the second round in what promises to be a titanic struggle between Russia and China for African affections. The Soviet leader has behaved in predictable fashion. He has condemned Western imperialism and pledged further assistance to African independence movements, additional economic aid to emerging African states and support to the Arab world in its quarrel with Israel. Each of these positions represented a response to Chou En-lai's earlier bid for influence among 250,000,000 Africans. Moreover, when Khrushchev decried the creation of racial or ethnic divisions in the world and championed instead "true proletarian internationalism," he was directly challenging Peking's right to speak in the name of progress of Marxism.
Premier Khrushchev's trip to Egypt marks the second round in what promises to be a titanic struggle between Russia and China for African affections. The Soviet leader has behaved in predictable fashion. He has condemned Western imperialism and pledged further assistance to African independence movements, additional economic aid to emerging African states and support to the Arab world in its quarrel with Israel. Each of these positions represented a response to Chou En-lai's earlier bid for influence among 250,000,000 Africans. Moreover, when Khrushchev decried the creation of racial or ethnic divisions in the world and championed instead "true proletarian internationalism," he was directly challenging Peking's right to speak in the name of progress of Marxism.
The Russians know that they are in serious trouble in the non-Western world today, and that many of their problems are caused not by the West but by their former comrades in Peking. The People's Republic of China, despite its substantial military and economic weaknesses, is now locked in a bitter struggle with the Soviet Union. It has already won some signal victories in Asia, particularly within the Communist movement, and it is now determined to make Africa the next major target. By the time the march toward independence has been completed on this continent, it is likely that some 40 sovereign states will have emerged. This will represent approximately one-third of the entire community of nations.
Soviet leaders are thus well aware of the fact that the outcome of this struggle could be crucial to the ultimate balance of power both in the world and in the Communist camp. They also know that this struggle cannot be won by military means. They have begun to fight hard, using a variety of psychological, political and economic weapons. But the battle is only in its opening stages, and it will surely grow more fierce. African leaders, meanwhile, watch developments with mixed emotions. There are certain advantages in being wooed vigorously by a number of suitors, but there are real dangers involved when complex international rivalries are transplanted onto the African continent.
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Among the issues on which Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill differed, none was more pregnant with meaning for the future than their respective assessments of the coming international role of China. The American President saw China as a potential major power, a force that would bulk large in the postwar era, particularly in Asia. The British Prime Minister regarded China as an "emerging society," to use the vernacular of today, one certain to be beset by multiple internal problems for the foreseeable future and hence incapable of sustaining a consistent, forceful international position. In retrospect, one can say that vital elements of truth lay with both assessments, and from this fact stem the complexities of Chinese foreign policy today.
Never before have we seen such an extraordinary display of disunity in the Communist world. Moscow's policy of rapprochement with Tito is regarded by Peking and its supporters as further proof of the fundamentally revisionist, anti-Marxian character of "the Khrushchev group." Peking views the indecisive Soviet policy regarding the Sino-Indian conflict-Moscow's precarious attempt to carry water on both shoulders-as a typical failure of Khrushchev to give full support to a "fraternal socialist ally." It brands the Soviet decision to withdraw missiles from Cuba as appeasement of American imperialism, a clear manifestation of the pacifism and fear that it now regularly describes as the trademarks of Russian diplomacy.
In one sense Russia and China pose the same problems. An international order of trade and cooperation has been established, and the two countries are in the process of joining. But their central governments are weak -- Russia's military is quasi-independent of Moscow, China's factories do not heed Beijing. Humiliation over national decline prompts symbolic defiance of the United States. Ukraine and Taiwan remain dangerous flash points that call for tacit deterrence. Like adolescents, Russia and China are in a transitional stage requiring patience and guidance rather than confrontation.
