VIET NAM: DO WE UNDERSTAND REVOLUTION?
Whatever course the long struggle in Viet Nam finally takes, short of nuclear holocaust, one thing seems certain: the people of Viet Nam still will be there. This is a reminder that war in Viet Nam is a "people's war." As such, it is a constantly recurring phenomenon of this period of man's history. How it is fought and what happens to the Vietnamese people as a result have meanings, therefore, far beyond today or the boundaries of Viet Nam itself. "People's wars" elsewhere will also make demands on the American people to help solve them. Thus, although the hour is late in Viet Nam, terribly so, there is time yet for Americans to consider the war in Viet Nam in its "people" nature, especially as regards what American assistance in these critical months will come to mean to the Vietnamese people in their own future, and to us in ours.
Whatever course the long struggle in Viet Nam finally takes, short of nuclear holocaust, one thing seems certain: the people of Viet Nam still will be there. This is a reminder that war in Viet Nam is a "people's war." As such, it is a constantly recurring phenomenon of this period of man's history. How it is fought and what happens to the Vietnamese people as a result have meanings, therefore, far beyond today or the boundaries of Viet Nam itself. "People's wars" elsewhere will also make demands on the American people to help solve them. Thus, although the hour is late in Viet Nam, terribly so, there is time yet for Americans to consider the war in Viet Nam in its "people" nature, especially as regards what American assistance in these critical months will come to mean to the Vietnamese people in their own future, and to us in ours.
Nearly four years ago now, on December 20, 1960, the Communists set up the political base with which they hoped to win Viet Nam by revolutionary struggle. The base consisted of an idea and of an organization to start giving that idea reality. Both the idea and the concept of the organization were foreign, having traveled the distance in time and space from Lenin in the Soviet Union via Mao in China.
The Communist idea was to gain control of the 14,000,000 people living in South Viet Nam by destroying their faith in their own government and creating faith in the inevitability of a Communist take-over. The organization to do this through a phased series of disciplined actions was called "The National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam." It had a central committee to direct its operations, the beginnings of a country-wide apparatus for political-psychological-military actions, and a wide assortment of member "fronts," manned by small cadres, to appeal politically to mass groupings of Vietnamese people: the farmers, the workers, the youth, the intellectuals, and even the civil servants and military.
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Aviable political settlement in South Viet Nam will reflect and give some legitimacy to the balance of political, military and social forces produced by a decade of internal conflict and five years of large-scale warfare. A successful settlement can also inaugurate a process of political accommodation through which the various elements of Vietnamese society may eventually be brought together into a functioning polity. American objectives and American expectations of what can be achieved at the conference table and on the battlefield should, correspondingly, be based on the realities of power and the opportunities for accommodation.
A Henry Kissinger has written, public support is "the acid test of a foreign policy." For a President to be successful in maintaining his nation's security he needs to believe, and others need to believe, that he has solid support at home. It was President Johnson's judgment that if the United States permitted the fall of Vietnam to communism, American politics would turn ugly and inward and the world would be a less safe place in which to live. Later, President Nixon would declare: "The right way out of Vietnam is crucial to our changing role in the world, and the peace in the world." In order to gain support for these judgments and the objectives in Vietnam which flowed from them, our Presidents have had to weave together the steel-of-war strategy with the strands of domestic politics.
Viet Nam has become more than a small country in South- east Asia. It has become a symbol of a new kind of American involvement in world affairs and a focus for intense and bitter divisions throughout every facet of American society. Few issues have produced a greater flow of books, articles, speeches, journalism and TV reports and commentaries. This stream of words has been devoted almost exclusively to two subjects: the conduct of the war, with speculations about appropriate military strategy and prospects, and the political and moral issues of the position of the United States and its allies. Whether the people of Viet Nam prosper or become permanent economic and political cripples or dependents, and how they may construct a viable nation after the fighting ceases, are issues that are rarely discussed. Yet the answers to such questions may determine the future even more than the direct outcome of the war itself. Whether the sacrifice of lives and treasure has been wasted, what lies ahead for Southeast Asia as a region, and indeed, the future standing and influence of the United States in the Pacific Basin will depend largely on the skill-or lack of it-with which the postwar economic development and reconstruction of Viet Nam, both South and North, are planned and carried out.
