DURING recent Congressional debates on aid legislation many harsh things were said about the United Arab Republic and its President. One Senator stated that "Col. Abdel Nasser . . . has been responsible more than any other single individual for keeping the political cauldron boiling in the arid, strife-torn Middle East . . . pouring oil on whatever brush fires break out." President Nasser has been equally sharp and critical. Early in 1964 he publicly described American foreign policy toward the Arab world as "not based on justice but on the support and consolidation of the base of aggression, Israel, and we cannot, under any circumstances, accept it."
A CRISIS IN CONFIDENCE
DURING recent Congressional debates on aid legislation many harsh things were said about the United Arab Republic and its President. One Senator stated that "Col. Abdel Nasser . . . has been responsible more than any other single individual for keeping the political cauldron boiling in the arid, strife-torn Middle East . . . pouring oil on whatever brush fires break out." President Nasser has been equally sharp and critical. Early in 1964 he publicly described American foreign policy toward the Arab world as "not based on justice but on the support and consolidation of the base of aggression, Israel, and we cannot, under any circumstances, accept it."
To be sure, much of this may be dismissed as political talk for the public ear. Nasser, no less than American Senators, has a constituency which periodically must be stirred up and marshaled for support. There is thus little new in the current skirmishing between Arab and American spokesmen- but those who follow U.S.A.-U.A.R. relations closely feel there ought to be. For this increased tempo in verbal attacks comes during a period of notable improvement in relations, when both the United States and the U.A.R., as a matter of basic policy, have been trying to get along with each other.
For both parties the change began in the aftermath of the Suez affair. By its prompt support of the United Nations and its refusal to back the Israeli-Anglo-French invasion, the United States gave practical proof of its impartiality in Middle East quarrels which threatened the peace of the area and the world. This was followed by a quiet mending of relations in the closing days of the Eisenhower Administration. Economic aid to Egypt was cautiously reinstituted and a franker exchange of views took place. President Kennedy supported and expanded this policy, identifying the Middle East as an area vital to American interests. He sought to develop relations with Egypt around points of mutual interest, while recognizing that the United States had, and would continue to have, sharp differences with Nasser.
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THE recent Six Day War in the Middle East grew out of the sterile confrontation to which the peoples of the region had committed themselves over the past twenty years. Both parties had frequently proclaimed their intention to go to war under certain circumstances. It seems unlikely, however, that any of them plotted and planned war for 1967. It seems more likely that they blundered into it.
In mid-November of last year, I concluded an article for Foreign Affairs on the October War and the future of the Arab-Israeli conflict by saying that a resolution of the conflict had at last become a real possibility for the parties directly concerned, and an imperative necessity for all the outsiders that have been involved in it. I added that a successful wedding of the outside powers' need to the possibilities latent in the situation required sensitivity to the fundamental concerns of the parties, imaginative diplomacy, and statesmanlike timing. In the nine months that have elapsed since I wrote those words, the United States, Europe and Japan, and up to this point the Soviet Union, have given ample evidence of their eagerness for peace. The United States in particular has taken the lead in trying to promote an Arab-Israeli settlement, and Secretary of State Kissinger has twice treated the world to breathtaking experiments in diplomacy, shuttling between half a dozen capitals to sustain two "campaigns" of negotiations of hitherto unprecedented intensity.
In the Middle East, old-fashioned balance-of-power politics are back. To successfully play the game, the United States should pay close attention to the Arab-Israeli peace process, while keeping Iran off balance.

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