Many reasons may be advanced to explain the differences between Spanish and Portuguese policies in Africa. The most obvious may be that while Portugal's African provinces are together 22 times the size of the mother country, Spanish Africa, totaling 115,000 square miles but with only 472,000 inhabitants, is of very little importance to present-day Spain. It nevertheless is striking that at a time when the whole of Africa has either freed itself from colonial control or is in turbulence, the Spanish flag continues to fly quietly over a series of outposts from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Guinea. While other European possessions disappear one after the other, Ceuta, Melilla, Ifni, Sahara, Fernando Poo and Rio Muni remain outwardly oblivious to the "wind of change."
Many reasons may be advanced to explain the differences between Spanish and Portuguese policies in Africa. The most obvious may be that while Portugal's African provinces are together 22 times the size of the mother country, Spanish Africa, totaling 115,000 square miles but with only 472,000 inhabitants, is of very little importance to present-day Spain. It nevertheless is striking that at a time when the whole of Africa has either freed itself from colonial control or is in turbulence, the Spanish flag continues to fly quietly over a series of outposts from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Guinea. While other European possessions disappear one after the other, Ceuta, Melilla, Ifni, Sahara, Fernando Poo and Rio Muni remain outwardly oblivious to the "wind of change."
Perhaps because Spain has been anxious to avoid drawing world attention to its own domestic sphere, it has adopted a comparatively liberal policy toward its African territories. What is remarkable is that the policy is being carried out by a nationalistic and conservative military establishment, which is gradually accepting a partial withdrawal from Africa. To carry out this policy, the Spanish régime has chosen a subtle combination of economic generosity, deep-rooted paternalism and strict political vigilance, presented in a Catholic context and with historical references to suit the occasion. As it wishes to remain strong and be free to make its own decisions, it has been careful to avoid putting itself in a position where concessions might be wrung from it. It has succeeded in retaining the initiative; there will be no "Götterdämmerung" like that of 1898. The diplomacy which has been guiding the course of Spain's African policy for the past three years is characterized by pragmatism, flexibility and temporization. On the issue of decolonization, then, there are no parallels between the attitudes of Lisbon and Madrid. As the Spanish Ambassador in Paris stated unequivocally: "Spain does not endorse Portuguese policy in Africa."
In considering the various aspects of decolonization as it proceeds in Spanish Africa, and the tortuous course it sometimes follows, we must distinguish between the "Places of Sovereignty" and the four "provinces" existing at present.
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The importance of southern Europe to the balance of power in world affairs has been underlined by the continuing crisis in the Middle East, the growth of Russian power in the Mediterranean and President Nixon's diplomatic journey in the autumn of 1970. The earlier renewal of the Spanish-American military pact, followed by Nixon's visit to Madrid, once more called attention to the role played by the Spanish government. At the same time, the future of the Franco régime has raised more questions than at any time in the past two decades, if only because of the fact that Franco himself entered his seventy-ninth year at the close of 1970 and in the preceding year took the unprecedented step of officially designating a successor, Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón, as heir to the Spanish throne.
In 1963 the United States can renegotiate her alliance with Spain. If neither party were to raise new conditions, the ten-year-old alliance would be automatically extended, to last another ten years. However, General Franco has already hinted that he wants to bargain for further military aid. The political structure of the country with which the U.S. Government is now probably preparing to confirm its friendship is at an especially interesting stage.
As part of this effort, conversations have been started in Brussels, on the initiative of the Spanish Government, in order to study the problems faced by the Spanish economy as a result of the operation of the Common Market. On February 9 last, the E.E.C. authorities presented a questionnaire to the Spanish Government asking specifically about important aspects of the relations between the Six and Spain which had been studied in a Spanish report of December 9, 1964. The Spanish Government's answer to the questionnaire was handed to the E.E.C. in June.

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