Risks of Nuclear Proliferation

NEW DIRECTIONS IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

THREE and a half years ago when John J. McCloy gave an accounting in this journal of where we stood in efforts for disarmament the picture which he presented was understandably somber.[i] In the previous September there had been some progress in the negotiation of a "Joint Statement of Agreed Principles," an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on certain criteria that would have to be met if progress was to be made on substantive measures. But that one hopeful development had to be balanced against a record of discouragingly little progress in any other negotiations, growing difficulties over Berlin culminating in the erection of the Wall, and the termination, also in September 1961, of the understanding on the nuclear-test cessation.

Since then significant changes have occurred in Soviet-American relations and these have substantially affected the prospects for arms control and disarmament. The resolution of the Cuban missile crisis appears to have been a major turning point in this difficult search. Since that time, the Soviet Union appears to have appreciated to a degree not apparent before that its long-term interests might best be served by increased emphasis on internal development and a relaxation of the cold war. In the field of arms control and disarmament, this has been reflected in increased interest in small steps which, though they lack some of the popular appeal of general and complete disarmament, are more realistically attainable in the foreseeable future. There has been some real progress: creation of the so- called hot line between Washington and Moscow; the United Nations resolution banning the placement in space of weapons of mass destruction; some evidence of progress through mutual example in the simultaneous announcement of cutbacks in planned production of fissionable materials and in apparent reductions in military budgets; and, most notably, the treaty prohibiting nuclear tests except underground.

II

Registration Required: Log in to continue reading

To continue reading, you must be a registered user or Foreign Affairs subscriber.

Please log in below or register with ForeignAffairs.com.

Buy PDF

Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.