Any appraisal of the Communist parties in Western Europe must begin with a distinction that may appear semantic but really touches on one of the most exposed nerves of this strange movement which claims a unique understanding of history, indeed the capacity to "make" history, and yet which contemporary history has so badly lacerated. Communism is a factor, sometimes serious, sometimes vestigial in Western Europe today; but "Western European Communism" does not exist. There is no historically evolved fraternity of parties accustomed to mutual exchange and fitting their national particularities into a common strategy, based on a joint analysis of the economic and social terrain that has, since the war, become increasingly integrated.
Any appraisal of the Communist parties in Western Europe must begin with a distinction that may appear semantic but really touches on one of the most exposed nerves of this strange movement which claims a unique understanding of history, indeed the capacity to "make" history, and yet which contemporary history has so badly lacerated. Communism is a factor, sometimes serious, sometimes vestigial in Western Europe today; but "Western European Communism" does not exist. There is no historically evolved fraternity of parties accustomed to mutual exchange and fitting their national particularities into a common strategy, based on a joint analysis of the economic and social terrain that has, since the war, become increasingly integrated.
The Communists are a collection of forces, whose estrangement from one another has been concealed by a common ideology. Some parties are but sects under ambitious (and often picturesque) chieftains, as has been the case in Holland, Switzerland and Luxembourg. Others are the left wings of expiring or reviving nationalisms, as in Iceland or Cyprus and perhaps in Belgium. Some are the vestiges of movements whose followers have turned to left-wing Socialist parties en masse, as in Denmark and Norway. Certain parties may yet have a future, as in Spain and Portugal, whereas in Western Germany Communism is a ghost that broods over calamitous error and tragedy from which a once proud movement could not recover. Some parties, as in Sweden, strive desperately to achieve rejuvenation, rejecting even a formal solidarity with their ideological kinsmen. In France, Italy and Finland, where the Communists lead formidable electoral blocs, they cannot integrate themselves into their political communities with any real hope of influencing policy unless they undergo an inner transformation. This must call into question rather basic ideas and modes of behavior, not the least of which is their attitude toward Western Europe as an entity.
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A Still-European Union
Wolfgang Schauble
David Phillips is right to argue that "Turkey is a crucial ally for the West" ("Turkey's Dreams of Accession," September/October 2004) but wrong to claim that only full membership in the EU will preserve that relationship.
"Wer von Europa spricht, hat unrecht," Bismarck said: "Whoever speaks of Europe is wrong." After reading a great deal of what has been written about Europe, one is tempted to agree with the old statesman. It has become increasingly difficult to get one's bearings. Are pro-Europeans for or against the Americans? For or against the Russians? For or against other Europeans? Can one find clear answers to these questions?
The hope of joining the EU has driven major reforms in Turkey, including economic liberalization, human rights protection, and greater civilian oversight of the military. But these reforms have fueled suspicions among Islamists and hard-line army officers. EU membership would help Turkey become a successful Muslim democracy, strengthen it as an ally in the fight against terrorism, and foster liberalization in the Islamic world.
