Over the full range of contemporary foreign affairs, American policy toward Western Europe has been marked by durability and rare continuity. The change of neither Presidents, Secretaries of State nor political parties has altered the lines of basic policy. The Government marches with American public opinion, for that ubiquitous man in the street still feels deeply that Western Europe is vital to the United States.
Over the full range of contemporary foreign affairs, American policy toward Western Europe has been marked by durability and rare continuity. The change of neither Presidents, Secretaries of State nor political parties has altered the lines of basic policy. The Government marches with American public opinion, for that ubiquitous man in the street still feels deeply that Western Europe is vital to the United States.
NATO has been the symbol of the metamorphosis of our foreign policy-of American rejection of 150 years of isolation, of a willingness to play a leading role and of recognition that American security can be assured only in collaboration with a free Western Europe. Due to our awareness of Europe's increasing importance in the economic affairs of the world, the United States in 1960 took an initiative which led to the establishment of a companion body to NATO, the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development.
The second major element of American policy has been support for the idea of a united Europe. Even before Robert Schuman's proposal of May 1950 for a European Coal and Steel Community, Congress each year inserted in authorizations for the Marshall Plan an admonition urging Europe to unite. This American reaction is not surprising, since it is natural to assume that political institutions which serve one people well might serve others with equal benefit. One of the first Americans to offer this advice to Europe was Benjamin Franklin, who wrote from Philadelphia to Ferdinand Grand in Paris, on October 22, 1787:
I send you enclos'd the propos'd new Federal Constitution for these States. I was engag'd 4 months of the last Summer in the Convention that form'd it. It is now sent by Congress to the Several States for their Confirmation. If it succeeds, I do not see why you might not in Europe carry the Project of good Henry the 4th into Execution, by forming a Federal Union and One Grand Republick of all its different States and Kingdoms, by means of a like Convention, for we had many Interests to reconcile.
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Assesses (1) progress in the evolution of a European security identity, with particular reference to the EC's handling of the Yugoslav crisis (2) how US foreign policy should adjust itself thereto. "The starting point for American policy should be an end to ambivalence over the Europeans building some defense co-operation of their own", and the USA should recognize that "NATO will not continue to serve as the cornerstone for an American political role in Europe".
Why is America alone in defending the West's far-flung interests? NATO allies can project power too, instead of waiting for a helping hand from across the ocean.
Since nuclear deterrence began, some of the forces providing deterrence for the West have been stationed in Europe. In the early period, when delivery systems did not yet enjoy intercontinental range, European real estate was essential for America's strategic deterrent. But with new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-based nuclear missiles, introduced in the late 1950s, the U.S. nuclear deterrent no longer required bases in Europe: the age of geographic deterrence identity between the United States and its European allies had come to an end.

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