Since the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, American arms-control policy has been dominated by efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons capabilities. Proposals for a non-proliferation agreement-a treaty which would prohibit signatory states not already having nuclear weapons from acquiring them-have recently been put on the table by both East and West in the form of draft treaties, but beyond that little real progress has been made. Meanwhile, the growing nuclear capability of Communist China has led a number of non-nuclear countries to reassess their strategic security positions and to ponder whether they, too, do not want to manufacture nuclear weapons. To deter them, the nuclear powers have intensified their search for something to sweeten the non-proliferation pot.
Since the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, American arms-control policy has been dominated by efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons capabilities. Proposals for a non-proliferation agreement-a treaty which would prohibit signatory states not already having nuclear weapons from acquiring them-have recently been put on the table by both East and West in the form of draft treaties, but beyond that little real progress has been made. Meanwhile, the growing nuclear capability of Communist China has led a number of non-nuclear countries to reassess their strategic security positions and to ponder whether they, too, do not want to manufacture nuclear weapons. To deter them, the nuclear powers have intensified their search for something to sweeten the non-proliferation pot.
The United States has held out the prospect of support against nuclear threats to countries which continue to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. On October 18, 1964, before the dust from the first Chinese nuclear explosion had settled, President Johnson declared that the United States would continue to work against "nuclear spread." He then said: "The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that, if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it."[i] The United Kingdom has also included in its negotiating position the possibility of some form of guarantee against nuclear attack for those nations willing to pledge themselves to a course of nuclear-weapons abstinence. To date, however, no nuclear power has been prepared to be specific about how such guarantees might work.
To guarantee the security of a nation without nuclear weapons against nuclear attack seems at first glance to be a reasonable, in fact minimal, price to pay to avoid proliferation. However, the deeper implications of nuclear guarantees need to be examined before we decide to move from the domain of the speechmaker, where the matter presently rests, to the kind of foreign policy upon which nations act.
First, we should clarify what we mean by a "national nuclear weapons capability." It rests on the possession of nuclear weapons, means of delivery and the ability of the national government to make its own decision on the use of the weapons. None of these three elements can be ignored. An effective delivery system in particular may be more difficult to acquire in some cases than nuclear warheads.
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The achievement of a common Soviet-American position on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is of major international importance. Whether or not it leads to a treaty obtaining a large number of signatures, the two countries have now formally recognized one of their strongest common interests. What impact this will have on their ability to work together over a wider range of security problems remains to be seen and depends on many other factors. For the moment, the central question is what influence the great powers generally can exert on the non-nuclear powers to refrain from constructing nuclear forces. Once the Soviet, American and British Governments have discovered, as they will, that 125 or more governments cannot and will not bind themselves and their successors to renounce unconditionally weapons which five major powers possess, the hard struggle to resist proliferation can begin in earnest. It starts with the substantial advantage that no non-nuclear country seems at present to be close to a decision to acquire a nuclear force.
The contemporary strategic era, dominated by ballistic missiles, has appeared to possess a curious kind of stability. Despite its uncertainties and dangers, two factors were apparently beyond dispute. On the one hand, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States could eliminate the other's missile forces in a first strike or effectively defend against a retaliatory missile strike. The offense seemed to have made a quantum jump against the defense: the old pattern of oscillation between defensive and offensive superiority had apparently been superseded by a period in which, for the foreseeable future, defense would be definitely inferior and incapable of matching offensive gains. On the other hand, missiles were so expensive and required so much technical sophistication that very few countries could either afford them or build them. The vexing problem of nuclear proliferation thus appeared in a new light. Even if a state could develop a nuclear bomb, it was assumed that it could not be a truly "effective" member of the nuclear club unless it also developed a missile to deliver it somewhere. The double task of building a bomb and a sophisticated delivery system inevitably seemed so difficult that the problem of preventing a thoroughly destabilizing nuclear proliferation appeared relatively simple. At worst, the process could be "managed."
The central fact today in the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union is that progress in technology has made it both necessary and possible to place restraints on the nuclear arms race. The technological stars and planets are now in favorable conjunction, so to speak-and they will not stay that way for long.
