THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASE: WHAT HAPPENED?
The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations." Article 92 of the United Nations Charter thus rounds out the grand design of what the Court itself has described as the "organized international community." This is the structure or framework for world order, which, however nascent and rudimentary, is an indispensable feature of the modern age.
The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations." Article 92 of the United Nations Charter thus rounds out the grand design of what the Court itself has described as the "organized international community." This is the structure or framework for world order, which, however nascent and rudimentary, is an indispensable feature of the modern age.
It was to the principal judicial organ of the United Nations that Ethiopia and Liberia submitted the protracted and unresolved dispute with South Africa concerning the interpretation and application of the Mandate for South West Africa, the very existence of which was denied by South Africa.
A summary of the history and background of the dispute is an essential prelude to the following discussion, which concerns: (1) Why the litigation was instituted. (2) What the Court did-1962. (3) What the Court did-1966. (4) Some lessons to be learned.
The Territory of South West Africa, a German colony prior to the First World War, was entrusted to South Africa in 1920 as a Mandate under the League of Nations Covenant. The Mandate System, of which South West Africa is the one vestigial remnant, comprised certain colonies and territories which, as a consequence of the war, had ceased to be under the sovereignty of the defeated states.
These colonies and territories, in the words of Article 22 of the League Covenant, were "inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world." The restoration of the colonial status quo ante or the immediate grant of independence were considered by the victors to be unacceptable solutions. Although the powers had publicly voiced opposition to territorial annexation as a proper end of victory, secret arrangements had in fact been made by Great Britain, France and Japan prior to the armistice. These arrangements provided, among other things, that three British Dominions were to have the right to annex, respectively, German South West Africa, New Guinea and German Samoa. South Africa was to receive the first of these.
After prolonged, often bitter, discussions at Versailles, the Allied Powers- largely as a result of President Wilson's vigorous insistence-accepted the principle of "no annexation." The Mandate System was devised as a new international institution.
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The dominant element in American foreign policy since 1946 has been opposition to communism and to the communist powers. As far as Africa was concerned, responsibility for pursuing these objectives was delegated to America's trusted allies - Britain, France, Belgium, and even Portugal - whose policies in the area were therefore broadly supported despite minor disagreements which arose as American business became interested in Africa's potential. Inevitably this placed America in opposition to an Africa which was trying to win its independence from those same powers; but when political freedom could be achieved peacefully, America was able to appear to Africa like a bystander. It was therefore able to adjust its policies and accept the new status quo of African sovereign states without any difficulty. Notwithstanding these adjustments, however, America has continued to look at African affairs largely through anti-communist spectacles and to disregard Africa's different concerns and priorities.
In civil war, hatreds are more intimate than in international conflict. The enemy is less awesome; he is killed with more conviction that he deserves it. Invariably-inevitably-the death tolls are higher. The American Civil War set records for its day. Despite the limited weaponry and skill, the Biafran war has taken the lives of an estimated two million people, mostly starved children. And now a war that is already engaging about 26,000 black guerrillas and approximately a quarter-million white or white-officered troops in Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia (the United Nations' new name for South West Africa) offers such a prospect of escalation that it can hardly help but be bigger, in cemetery terms, than Viet Nam. In this corner of the globe, whose fair hills make a savage contrast with the ugliness wrought by man, the restless spirit of Nazism, with its accent on genetic myth and legal caste, will perhaps be put to rest in a swamp of blood.
Conflict between the administration and Congress exemplifies the disarray of US policy towards Southern Africa. Reviews the background to the passage of the Anti-Apartheid Act, the goals of which, however, are not achievable in terms of practical politics. The Reagan administration has concentrated on white opinion, when a strategy of "black empowerment", defined as dialogue with the black leadership, would be more fruitful. Notes the relationship between regional re-stabilization and the use (or threat) of sanctions. For the remainder of 1988 the administration should concentrate on Namibia and Angola.

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