If the most powerful country and the most populous country in the world could not have a normal diplomatic relationship, they would have to invent a substitute. And they did. For eleven years the United States and the Chinese People's Republic have dealt directly with each other by means of their special if obscure arrangement known as the Ambassadorial Talks, held at irregular intervals, first in Geneva, then in Warsaw. Although the official record of the exchanges between their two Ambassadors has been kept secret by mutual agreement, official statements in Washington and Peking, together with news reports in both countries, provide some material for describing several high points of the "longest established permanent floating" diplomatic game in modern history. The United States has participated in three international conferences with the Chinese People's Republic, but in the course of them few or no bilateral discussions or contacts took place informally on the side; thus the principal American dealings with Peking have occurred in the Ambassadorial Talks. It is time to recognize and appraise these unusual dealings.
If the most powerful country and the most populous country in the world could not have a normal diplomatic relationship, they would have to invent a substitute. And they did. For eleven years the United States and the Chinese People's Republic have dealt directly with each other by means of their special if obscure arrangement known as the Ambassadorial Talks, held at irregular intervals, first in Geneva, then in Warsaw. Although the official record of the exchanges between their two Ambassadors has been kept secret by mutual agreement, official statements in Washington and Peking, together with news reports in both countries, provide some material for describing several high points of the "longest established permanent floating" diplomatic game in modern history. The United States has participated in three international conferences with the Chinese People's Republic, but in the course of them few or no bilateral discussions or contacts took place informally on the side; thus the principal American dealings with Peking have occurred in the Ambassadorial Talks. It is time to recognize and appraise these unusual dealings.
They are a distinctive paradox, empty of results but full of consequences. Through them Washington has probably had a more continuous diplomatic contact and diversified dialogue with the government in Peking than any of the non-Communist Western governments which maintain embassies there. Yet, despite the long duration of the Talks and the voluminous exchanges made in them, they have transacted only one agreement in all that time. In fact, nineteen specific proposals known to have been made by one side or the other have been publicly rejected. Nevertheless, this forum has proven of some lasting value.
The crucial feature of the Talks is that they provide a workable channel for reducing miscalculations, clarifying intentions and explaining proposals. The President has a dependable "switchboard" immediately available to talk with the Politburo in Peking about Viet Nam, nuclear disarmament, the improvement of relations or anything else. The responsible leaders in Peking have the same facility in reverse when they choose to use it. Each government can note the varying emphases and slight nuances in the official expressions which pass across the table in the privacy of the conference room. And the cumulative experience has established some credibility for both sides, indispensable to any form of diplomatic dealings.
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The provisions of the Japanese Constitution barring the resort to war as an instrument of Japanese policy, and effectively committing Japan not to maintain armed forces on a major scale, has long raised the question how Japan's security is to be assured in a world still replete with sources of international conflict. As late as 1948 it was still General MacArthur's view, if the writer of these lines understood him correctly, that it would not be essential for the United States to maintain armed forces on the Japanese archipelago permanently or for a protracted time either for its own security or for that of Japan; in his view, the most suitable status for Japan would be one of permanent demilitarization and neutralization under such general protection as might be afforded by the United Nations and by the friendly interest of the United States. He appeared to believe, as did this writer, that if such a status could be arranged with the concurrence of the Soviet Government, the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Japan would be minimal; and it was not easy to see from what other quarter Japan could be seriously threatened. This concept assumed, of course, an eventual agreement between the Soviet Union, the United States and other interested parties, on the terms of a Japanese peace settlement.
For some months, 1966 promised to be a year of significant albeit gradual change in American policy toward Communist China. In a strange and paradoxical fashion, the emotional issues of the Viet Nam War opened the way for the most sober, responsible and even-handed public discussion of China since the Communists came to power. At Congressional hearings and in the mass media, scholars and leaders of opinion have dispassionately calculated the possibilities for change, and Administration leaders have in their customarily guarded language intimated that change was not impossible. Most significant of all, the American public demonstrated a gratifying degree of maturity by forgetting the old passions and asking for only facts and analyses about the new China. Our national mood was increasingly one of believing that with prudence and wisdom it would be possible to work toward gradually incorporating China into responsible world relationships.
In taking the war upon himself, Robert S. McNamara forgets that containment abroad and anticommunism at home virtually ensured the Vietnam tragedy.

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