The rioting crowds that clamored at the gates of the Japanese Diet building in May and June and the throngs of Zengakuren students who snake-danced wildly down the streets of Tokyo and swarmed over Hagerty's car at Haneda Airport have given pause to many persons in both the United States and Japan. . . . Never since the end of the war has the gap in understanding between Americans and Japanese been wider than over this incident. . . .
The rioting crowds that clamored at the gates of the Japanese Diet building in May and June and the throngs of Zengakuren students who snake-danced wildly down the streets of Tokyo and swarmed over Hagerty's car at Haneda Airport have given pause to many persons in both the United States and Japan. . . . Never since the end of the war has the gap in understanding between Americans and Japanese been wider than over this incident. . . .
All this reveals a weakness of communication between the Western democracies and opposition elements in Japan. Though the latter include the most fervent supporters of peace and democracy, their thinking is so far removed from that of their counterparts in the West that sometimes no real dialogue is possible. On top of the ever-present language barrier stands an even higher barrier of unspoken assumptions that make true understanding difficult.
THESE quotations are from "The Broken Dialogue with Japan," an article which I wrote for the October 1960 issue of this review. There I pointed out that the disturbances might be seen by some as "a sign of the growing gap between the party in power and its opponents, of rising tension and violence that can only end in leftist revolution or a Fascistic suppression of the opposition." I also noted that "an unfriendly Japan or even a strictly neutralist Japan might well mean the inevitable withdrawal of the American defense line to the mid-Pacific." My own conclusions, however, were more optimistic. I did not foresee a break in the defense relationship between the two countries and predicted that "Japan's practical politics will probably continue on its remarkably level course." I am glad to say that this hopeful prognosis seems fully justified today. The present article will report on what has happened in our "dialogue" in the interval, during which time I served as Ambassador to Japan.
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The United States and Japan approach a changing relationship. Japan wants the continued nuclear guarantee of the United States but is restive at the protracted American control of Okinawa and the irksome problems arising from American military bases in Japan. The natural desire of a leading industrial nation for a more "independent" foreign policy, including what is vaguely expressed as "autonomous defense," appears to be steadily growing. At the same time, the United States, under a new Administration and in a post-Viet Nam period, can be expected to reassess its responsibilities overseas, particularly in Asia. The simultaneous meeting in Japan of these forces for change could, if the gears mesh smoothly, produce a healthy transition toward a sounder, more mutually responsive Japanese-American relationship. On the other hand, misunderstandings or misplaced expectations on either or both sides could block such a happy result and damage the interests of both countries.
In the first century of our relations with Japan, both countries swung from extremes of high hope to despair, and back again to hope. Now, with greater opportunities to know each other and with a dialogue reopened between our intellectuals, there should be wiser calculations on both sides of the Pacific. Instead, we are again moving in different directions and, at least for the moment, there is the danger that high expectations will again founder on misunderstandings.
The provisions of the Japanese Constitution barring the resort to war as an instrument of Japanese policy, and effectively committing Japan not to maintain armed forces on a major scale, has long raised the question how Japan's security is to be assured in a world still replete with sources of international conflict. As late as 1948 it was still General MacArthur's view, if the writer of these lines understood him correctly, that it would not be essential for the United States to maintain armed forces on the Japanese archipelago permanently or for a protracted time either for its own security or for that of Japan; in his view, the most suitable status for Japan would be one of permanent demilitarization and neutralization under such general protection as might be afforded by the United Nations and by the friendly interest of the United States. He appeared to believe, as did this writer, that if such a status could be arranged with the concurrence of the Soviet Government, the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Japan would be minimal; and it was not easy to see from what other quarter Japan could be seriously threatened. This concept assumed, of course, an eventual agreement between the Soviet Union, the United States and other interested parties, on the terms of a Japanese peace settlement.

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