Uncertainty is necessarily the lot of the planner, since the deals with the future. Uncertainty can never be completely removed. However, it can be compensated for, and to do so is a continuing responsibility of those who plan military forces. Primarily this can be done by insuring, in so far as we can, that future weapons and forces will be adaptable to the right range of defense needs or, as defense planners often put it, by insuring flexibility.
Uncertainty is necessarily the lot of the planner, since the deals with the future. Uncertainty can never be completely removed. However, it can be compensated for, and to do so is a continuing responsibility of those who plan military forces. Primarily this can be done by insuring, in so far as we can, that future weapons and forces will be adaptable to the right range of defense needs or, as defense planners often put it, by insuring flexibility.
Modern weapons need not of themselves inexorably beget more sophisticated, expensive and destructive devices. It is true that pressures exist which, if unrestrained, would needlessly proliferate and duplicate weapon designs. There is a tendency to do what potential opponents are doing, or thought to be doing, or predicted to be able to do. But restraint and direction are exercised. In acquiring the capability to defend the United States, direction is given and decisions are made at the highest level, by the President with the advice of the Secretaries of Defense and State. Assumptions, concepts, economic analyses, divergent estimates of potential danger to our national security-all periodically are translated into an explicit defense program for the United States. At least twice a year the Department of Defense updates this program and projects forces five years or more into the future. Specific decisions flow from a continuing interaction between perceptions of what is technologically and economically feasible, and defense policy-the broad guidelines for achieving national objectives by the direct or potential use of armed force. In turn, specific program decisions and their subsequent results condition both future weapons development and future defense policy.
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The specter of weapons of mass destruction being used against America looms larger today than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis. The World Trade Center bombing scarcely hints at the enormity of the danger. America is prepared only for conventional terrorism, not a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons catastrophe. With the right approach and organization, however, the United States can be ready. Herewith a plan to reorganize the U.S. government to ensure that it can handle the threats of the next century.
Nineteen sixty-nine may be remembered as the year Americans woke up to the importance of an issue that was to be a dominant one in the 1970s. The question of Viet Nam still had the emotional clout. The great ABM debate still captured most of the headlines. But more and more people were beginning to see that bigger and more permanent than both of these was the question of whether America's military spending could be brought under more rational control. In the winter of 1969 it became increasingly clear that we had to find a way to reorient our national priorities so that imperative human needs on the home front were not always being shunted aside because of the claims of "national security." No longer could it be successfully argued that we could afford the needed amounts of "guns and butter." A difficult choice-or at least choices-had to be made, and would have to be made repeatedly, for many years to come.
American foreign policy is changing, but the machinery of government is not changing with it. As we try to enter what President Nixon has called an era of negotiation, it is time to ask whether the nation is well served by the immense foreign affairs bureaucracies that have grown up in Washington over the past quarter-century. Could institutional reform give new coherence to our foreign policy? How these questions are answered may well determine the success or failure of American diplomacy in the seventies.

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