The achievement of a common Soviet-American position on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is of major international importance. Whether or not it leads to a treaty obtaining a large number of signatures, the two countries have now formally recognized one of their strongest common interests. What impact this will have on their ability to work together over a wider range of security problems remains to be seen and depends on many other factors. For the moment, the central question is what influence the great powers generally can exert on the non-nuclear powers to refrain from constructing nuclear forces. Once the Soviet, American and British Governments have discovered, as they will, that 125 or more governments cannot and will not bind themselves and their successors to renounce unconditionally weapons which five major powers possess, the hard struggle to resist proliferation can begin in earnest. It starts with the substantial advantage that no non-nuclear country seems at present to be close to a decision to acquire a nuclear force.
The achievement of a common Soviet-American position on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is of major international importance. Whether or not it leads to a treaty obtaining a large number of signatures, the two countries have now formally recognized one of their strongest common interests. What impact this will have on their ability to work together over a wider range of security problems remains to be seen and depends on many other factors. For the moment, the central question is what influence the great powers generally can exert on the non-nuclear powers to refrain from constructing nuclear forces. Once the Soviet, American and British Governments have discovered, as they will, that 125 or more governments cannot and will not bind themselves and their successors to renounce unconditionally weapons which five major powers possess, the hard struggle to resist proliferation can begin in earnest. It starts with the substantial advantage that no non-nuclear country seems at present to be close to a decision to acquire a nuclear force.
With or without a nonproliferation treaty, therefore, we face a substantial task. In the immediate future, as in the immediate past, the significant countries will be those which are capable of taking a decision to develop nuclear forces. A reasonable estimate is that this number now stands at three-Germany, Japan and Canada-with Sweden, Italy and India close behind. To discourage this small but growing group of industrial, non-nuclear countries from developing nuclear weapons is essentially a political problem. In the course of the next fifteen years or so, Australia, the Netherlands, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Israel, Brazil, Switzerland, the German Democratic Republic and Poland will be among those who might achieve the necessary technical and financial capacity.
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Since the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, American arms-control policy has been dominated by efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons capabilities. Proposals for a non-proliferation agreement-a treaty which would prohibit signatory states not already having nuclear weapons from acquiring them-have recently been put on the table by both East and West in the form of draft treaties, but beyond that little real progress has been made. Meanwhile, the growing nuclear capability of Communist China has led a number of non-nuclear countries to reassess their strategic security positions and to ponder whether they, too, do not want to manufacture nuclear weapons. To deter them, the nuclear powers have intensified their search for something to sweeten the non-proliferation pot.
The nuclear proliferation problem, as posed, is insoluble. All policies to control proliferation have assumed that the rapid worldwide spread of nuclear power is essential to reduce dependence on oil, economically desirable, and inevitable; that efforts to inhibit the concomitant spread of nuclear bombs must not be allowed to interfere with this vital reality; and that the international political order must remain inherently discriminatory, dominated by bipolar hegemony and the nuclear arms race. These unexamined assumptions, which artificially constrain the arena of choice and maximize the intractability of the proliferation problem, underlay the influential Ford-MITRE report and were embodied in U.S. policy initiatives under Gerald Ford and especially Jimmy Carter to slow the spread of plutonium technologies. Identical assumptions underlay the recently concluded multilateral two-year International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), whose lack of sympathy for those U.S. initiatives is now being cited as a political and technical rationale for dismantling what is left of them. Unfortunately, INFCE's assumptions were widely represented as its conclusions, ostensibly resulting from a careful assessment of alternatives which never actually took place.
The central fact today in the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union is that progress in technology has made it both necessary and possible to place restraints on the nuclear arms race. The technological stars and planets are now in favorable conjunction, so to speak-and they will not stay that way for long.
