The Framework of East-West Reconciliation
Europe is increasingly restless with the division imposed on it more than twenty years ago. To end that division, and thereby to take a step toward a larger community of the developed nations, is a task requiring the often conflicting virtues of perseverance and imagination. It also requires asking explicitly: What can be done in the next twenty years to change this condition-and to change it in a way that is compatible with historical trends and more immediate requirements of political reality?
Europe is increasingly restless with the division imposed on it more than twenty years ago. To end that division, and thereby to take a step toward a larger community of the developed nations, is a task requiring the often conflicting virtues of perseverance and imagination. It also requires asking explicitly: What can be done in the next twenty years to change this condition-and to change it in a way that is compatible with historical trends and more immediate requirements of political reality?
I. THREE CONCEPTS IN SEARCH OF REALITY
Several concepts currently purport to provide an answer to the above questions. Three among them particularly stand out and deserve closer attention: The Atlantic conception, the "European Europe" Gaullist vision and the Soviet idea of a European security arrangement. Let it be said immediately that each, though in different ways, is inadequate or only partially satisfactory. One, rooted in the transitional setting of the cold war, even if generally in tune with the wider sweep of history, fails to respond to the growing political concerns of Europe; the second reflects current political moods but ignores historical trends; the third fails on both scores.
Usually, the Atlantic concept is employed to express not only an existing reality-that America and Europe have a special affinity-but a desire for a particular kind of relationship between them. The spectrum ranges from the notion of an intimate and integrated Atlantic community, with the United States and individual European states merging into one, to the famous concept of partnership between America and a more united Western Europe. Such a partnership, it is asserted, would generate an irresistible magnetic attraction to the East, and eventually the European problem-particularly the division of Germany-would somehow be resolved. Such a Europe would also share with America certain global responsibilities-a hope voiced more frequently by American than European spokesmen.
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Defends the traditional, pessimistic evaluation of NATO's conventional capabilities against revisionists, and argues that "NATO is highly unlikely to make the conventional force improvements seemingly dictated by the INF treaty". Predicts a Soviet arms control offensive upon "a vulnerable and divided NATO... the alliance has painted itself into a corner, and the paint will not dry". Despite all this, NATO will continue to prevent war in Europe.
In the crisis precipitated by the discovery of Russian strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems in Cuba, many Americans came to a new understanding of the great accretion of strength which membership in our alliances in this hemisphere and in Europe brings to a confrontation of power. They got a new understanding, too, of the vast importance of having choices of means, other than nuclear means, of meeting a hostile threat. These truths, seen in the sharp light of experience, bring into clearer relief the central problem of our European alliance.
In the light of the anticipated INF agreement the question is whether confrontation is entering a genuine phase of de-escalation or merely a tactical one. Most NATO commanders agree that a surprise attack by conventional Soviet forces is improbable. NATO should develop a plan for exploiting the potential for reductions in conventional weapons and make a serious effort to achieve an agreement. There may be room for trade-offs in economic credits and managerial skills for large-scale Soviet force reductions.

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