Northeast Thailand: Tomorrow's Viet Nam?
Insurgencies spring from local conditions. Though a truism, this statement is still valuable in helping to determine the probable seriousness of present or threatened communist guerrilla activities. Conditions in Northeast Thailand make it in many ways an obvious seat of insurgency, and the Thai and United States Governments are increasingly concerned.
TOMORROW'S VIET NAM?
Insurgencies spring from local conditions. Though a truism, this statement is still valuable in helping to determine the probable seriousness of present or threatened communist guerrilla activities. Conditions in Northeast Thailand make it in many ways an obvious seat of insurgency, and the Thai and United States Governments are increasingly concerned.
The area is large, impoverished and, until recently, neglected. Comprising about one-third of all Thailand, it is roughly the same size as neighboring Cambodia and has nearly twice the population. Geographically, the Northeast is a dry flat plateau, with sandy infertile soil, still largely under forest or scrub, and with insufficient water for effective agriculture or even for domestic needs. In consequence, the region is poor and its villages are largely isolated from the more prosperous central region of Thailand, and even-for lack of roads-from one another. The people of the Northeast, like most Thai farmers, own their own land; for example, in the Northeast (population 11 million, over 90 percent rural) some 95 percent of the farmers own their land. Thus there is virtually no problem of tenancy or of absentee landlordism as in Viet Nam, the Philippines or prewar China. But for all that, the Northeasterners have a per capita income only just over half the Thai national average.
The physical problems of the Northeast are enormous. Toward the end of the dry season-particularly from March to May-many of the shallow wells in the villages dry up completely. Then the villagers have to walk from one to three or four kilometers to the nearest deep well, carrying back all the water they need for washing, cooking and drinking. And the onset of the monsoon rains in May or June-lasting until October-is not an unmixed blessing. While at least in the dry half of the year the rough cart tracks between villages can be used by jeeps or motorcycles, during the rains the tracks deteriorate, fill with water and become impassable. As a result, provincial officials are restricted for a large part of the year-unless they care to walk-to the district towns and to those villages which are on or near the main roads. For example, some 40 to 50 percent of the villages in the "insecure" province of Sakon Nakorn are cut off in this way. This enforced isolation helps to explain some of the difficulties met in countering the spread of subversion or insurgency...
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The implications of an uncertain ceasefire in Indochina and the possible beginning of separate political dialogues in Laos and Cambodia have again focused attention on Washington's alliance with Thailand, the only nation on the mainland of Southeast Asia which the United States is bound by treaty to defend. Significantly too, Thailand faces an increasingly serious, if not yet critical, insurgency. No matter how the situation in each of the three Indochina states is finally resolved, President Nixon's decisions on Thailand in the next year will largely determine the future course of American policy and involvement in Southeast Asia during the decade ahead.
The theory of the falling dominoes in Southeast Asia has been the subject of heated debate. Yet few sensible observers would deny that a settlement in Viet Nam will have a significant impact on the overall course of political evolution in the area and, conversely, that changing political conditions in Southeast Asia will affect the outlook for a permanent settlement in Viet Nam. Even in the shorter perspective, the chances of finding a stable compromise solution acceptable to the fighting parties appear greater when seen in the broader framework than when we view the problem in its strictly Vietnamese dimensions. For in the narrow context of the two Viet Nams there seem to be no conceivable alternatives which do not imply a significant victory for one side and a defeat for the other.
As the war in Viet Nam grows in bitterness and destructiveness, the call for negotiation grows more insistent. The issue we confront, however, is not simply whether a settlement of the war should be negotiated. The question rather is a threefold one. How should we go about it? What can we expect from it? Can we arrange a settlement that has a fair chance of success? During the next several months, the American people, already emotionally tortured and intellectually frustrated by the war, are destined to be treated to large doses of oratory which will do nothing to lift the veil of confusion surrounding the question of negotiations. It may be worthwhile, then, to explore some of the issues and implications that we (and our allies and our adversaries) will have to deal with if, in fact, negotiations get under way.

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