IN all its two thousand or more years of history, Viet Nam has never been fully in control of its own destiny. We have suffered invasion by the Chinese, the Mongols, the Japanese and the French. We were administered as a protectorate of China for over a thousand years; we were a colony of France for nearly a century. We endured two and a half centuries of civil war between the Lords of the Trinh from the north and the Lords of the Nguyen from the south-a civil war in which the Dutch were heavily involved supporting the former and the Portuguese the latter.
A QUESTION OF CONFIDENCE
IN all its two thousand or more years of history, Viet Nam has never been fully in control of its own destiny. We have suffered invasion by the Chinese, the Mongols, the Japanese and the French. We were administered as a protectorate of China for over a thousand years; we were a colony of France for nearly a century. We endured two and a half centuries of civil war between the Lords of the Trinh from the north and the Lords of the Nguyen from the south-a civil war in which the Dutch were heavily involved supporting the former and the Portuguese the latter.
Despite this violent, protracted interplay of external and internal forces, our people have developed strong, distinctive characteristics. And out of the crosscurrents of Chinese, Hindu and Western civilizations and religions has emerged a Vietnamese culture all its own.
Just as the bamboo in our national crest symbolizes our resiliency in the face of uncontrollable forces of nature or man, so too does it emphasize the supple strength of the Vietnamese people and their deep roots in their own land. Though our past has been full of disappointments, our future, like the fresh green shoots of the bamboo, is full of hope. Whether we will succeed or fail is in large measure a question of confidence-confidence in our government, in our constitutional processes and in our ultimate victory over communism.
Before any real progress can be made in Viet Nam, the government must earn the confidence of the people. This cannot be done unless the government has confidence in itself; unless it knows in its own heart it is working for the good of the whole nation; unless it is prepared to explain to the simple people, the villagers in the countryside, what it is trying to do in language they will understand. It must be honest with the people and honest with itself.
When the government has confidence in itself it will be able to lead the Vietnamese people. It will set broad, simple goals that all elements of the nation can work toward together. In so doing it can begin to gather a wide base of support; it can show all different groups how they can best use their capabilities to move forward toward the common end.
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Viet Nam has become more than a small country in South- east Asia. It has become a symbol of a new kind of American involvement in world affairs and a focus for intense and bitter divisions throughout every facet of American society. Few issues have produced a greater flow of books, articles, speeches, journalism and TV reports and commentaries. This stream of words has been devoted almost exclusively to two subjects: the conduct of the war, with speculations about appropriate military strategy and prospects, and the political and moral issues of the position of the United States and its allies. Whether the people of Viet Nam prosper or become permanent economic and political cripples or dependents, and how they may construct a viable nation after the fighting ceases, are issues that are rarely discussed. Yet the answers to such questions may determine the future even more than the direct outcome of the war itself. Whether the sacrifice of lives and treasure has been wasted, what lies ahead for Southeast Asia as a region, and indeed, the future standing and influence of the United States in the Pacific Basin will depend largely on the skill-or lack of it-with which the postwar economic development and reconstruction of Viet Nam, both South and North, are planned and carried out.
The theory of the falling dominoes in Southeast Asia has been the subject of heated debate. Yet few sensible observers would deny that a settlement in Viet Nam will have a significant impact on the overall course of political evolution in the area and, conversely, that changing political conditions in Southeast Asia will affect the outlook for a permanent settlement in Viet Nam. Even in the shorter perspective, the chances of finding a stable compromise solution acceptable to the fighting parties appear greater when seen in the broader framework than when we view the problem in its strictly Vietnamese dimensions. For in the narrow context of the two Viet Nams there seem to be no conceivable alternatives which do not imply a significant victory for one side and a defeat for the other.
The war in Vietnam has lasted longer than any armed conflict outside our borders in which we have been engaged in the nearly two centuries of our independent existence, and disengagement and complete withdrawal are still a question mark. The conflict has engendered divided opinions, manifested in bitter and potentially dangerous confrontations among our people, and we still are uncertain what it was we sought and why, where we should now proceed, and what courses of action would best serve our national interests.

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