On Violence, Peace and the Rule of Law
Science and the increase of population are the major dynamics of our time. Science promises civilization its highest fulfillment but simultaneously threatens its survival. A billion more people will populate the earth in 10 years, three to four billion more in 30. No one can escape the combined impact of mass population and technology. We are, finally, truly interdependent.
Science and the increase of population are the major dynamics of our time. Science promises civilization its highest fulfillment but simultaneously threatens its survival. A billion more people will populate the earth in 10 years, three to four billion more in 30. No one can escape the combined impact of mass population and technology. We are, finally, truly interdependent.
In a world of such sweeping change, causing greater differences in daily human experience in one generation than in all previous history, the old rules have limited relevance. History teaches the wrong lessons. Metternich misleads. Present leaders of the world powers, indelibly impressed by Munich, fought in a world war before the Bomb. The experience that dominates much of their judgment was gained three decades ago, or more. It seemed then that weak men, confronted by fascism, doomed us to World War II because they sought "peace in our time," and as a consequence Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium and France fell like . . . dominoes.
The old wars, though cruel and inhumane, were gentle compared to what can be. Generals who fought battles with rifles, tanks and propeller-driven airplanes on strategies developed by Bonaparte, Lee and Rommel have new weapons that cannot be used in a traditional manner. More and more nations seek to devise and wield the destructive power of technology. Unless it is prohibited, they will.
Politicians, emotionally conditioned by conflicting ideologies such as communism, capitalism, imperialism, totalitarianism and democracy, and schooled in alliances, colonial empires, economic exploitation, spheres of influence, balances of power, détentes, wary stalemates and summitry, endlessly negotiate, or quarrel over meaningless issues. Meanwhile, all around them divisions grow, tensions heighten and fear and mistrust rise.
We must ask ourselves how long we can go on like this. Contemplate the vast change of the past 30 years. Assume there will be even greater change in the next 15. Does a continued standoff really assure survival?
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During the last week of April 1970 the Vietnam war became the Second Indochina War. On April 24 and 25 representatives of the four movements of the Indochinese Left convened at a certain spot in south China to seal an alliance that had been contracted many years before by three of the movements-the North Vietnamese Lao Dong, the Pathet Lao and the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF)-and to which Prince Sihanouk, overthrown a month earlier by the Cambodian Right, was now adhering in a conspicuously unconditional manner. The Indochinese revolutionary front thus came into being.
A Henry Kissinger has written, public support is "the acid test of a foreign policy." For a President to be successful in maintaining his nation's security he needs to believe, and others need to believe, that he has solid support at home. It was President Johnson's judgment that if the United States permitted the fall of Vietnam to communism, American politics would turn ugly and inward and the world would be a less safe place in which to live. Later, President Nixon would declare: "The right way out of Vietnam is crucial to our changing role in the world, and the peace in the world." In order to gain support for these judgments and the objectives in Vietnam which flowed from them, our Presidents have had to weave together the steel-of-war strategy with the strands of domestic politics.
Reexamining the 30 and more years since Indochina entered the agenda of world problems one is struck constantly by the curious mirages, the discordance between image and reality which seem to persist not only in American perceptions of Indochina but in the evaluations by other great powers and the Indochinese themselves of the actual nature and goals of U.S. policy.

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