American foreign policy is changing, but the machinery of government is not changing with it. As we try to enter what President Nixon has called an era of negotiation, it is time to ask whether the nation is well served by the immense foreign affairs bureaucracies that have grown up in Washington over the past quarter-century. Could institutional reform give new coherence to our foreign policy? How these questions are answered may well determine the success or failure of American diplomacy in the seventies.
GIGANTISM IN WASHINGTON
American foreign policy is changing, but the machinery of government is not changing with it. As we try to enter what President Nixon has called an era of negotiation, it is time to ask whether the nation is well served by the immense foreign affairs bureaucracies that have grown up in Washington over the past quarter-century. Could institutional reform give new coherence to our foreign policy? How these questions are answered may well determine the success or failure of American diplomacy in the seventies.
In 1902 Lenin asked, in an essay on the organizational problems of Russian Social Democracy, "What is to be done?" and offered this curious answer: "Liquidate the Third Period." The advice is timely, though in a different way than Lenin intended. America in 1970 also confronts an unsatisfactory third period which it wants to liquidate. We are living out the three-part drama of our postwar foreign policy, which opened with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in 1947, continued in the Eisenhower and Kennedy years with a global elaboration of these policies, and reached its tragic climax in Vietnam during the Johnson administration. Though our last President was hissed from the stage, the third act of the play continues in anticlimax. It is being "liquidated" slowly as troops come home from East Asia and commitments are reduced elsewhere. It has even received official burial, for President Nixon reported to Congress last February 18 that "the postwar period in international relations has ended." But it will be hard to turn that truism into effective action as long as rigidities built into the bureaucratic process undercut the President's announced policy.
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Uncertainty is necessarily the lot of the planner, since the deals with the future. Uncertainty can never be completely removed. However, it can be compensated for, and to do so is a continuing responsibility of those who plan military forces. Primarily this can be done by insuring, in so far as we can, that future weapons and forces will be adaptable to the right range of defense needs or, as defense planners often put it, by insuring flexibility.
The problem of the control of foreign policy has been a perennial source of anguish for democracies. The idea of popular government hardly seems complete if it fails to embrace questions of war and peace. Yet the effective conduct of foreign affairs appears to demand, as Tocqueville argued long ago, not the qualities peculiar to a democracy but "on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient" Steadfastness in a course, efficiency in the execution of policy, patience, secrecy-are not these more likely to proceed from executives than from legislatures? But, if foreign policy becomes the property of the executive, what happens to democratic control? In our own times this issue has acquired special urgency, partly because of the Indochina War, with its aimless persistence and savagery, but more fundamentally, I think, because the invention of nuclear weapons has transformed the power to make war into the power to blow up the world. And for the United States the question of the control of foreign policy is, at least in its constitutional aspect, the question of the distribution of powers between the presidency and the Congress.
"The most fundamental method of work ... is to determine our working policies according to the actual conditions. When we study the causes of the mistakes we have made, we find that they all arose because we departed from the actual situation . . . and were subjective in determining our working policies."-"The Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung."

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