Since September of 1970 a renewal of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis has been in prospect Highly placed White House sources reported that the Soviet Union had begun work on a submarine base on the southern coast of Cuba at Cienfuegos, a base which could repair and refuel missile-firing submarines of the Soviet Navy. Warnings were issued that this would be viewed with the "utmost seriousness" by the United States as a violation of the 1962 agreement by which land-based missiles were withdrawn from Cuba. Cited explicitly were President Kennedy's words that peace would be assured only "if all offensive missiles are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future."
Since September of 1970 a renewal of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis has been in prospect Highly placed White House sources reported that the Soviet Union had begun work on a submarine base on the southern coast of Cuba at Cienfuegos, a base which could repair and refuel missile-firing submarines of the Soviet Navy. Warnings were issued that this would be viewed with the "utmost seriousness" by the United States as a violation of the 1962 agreement by which land-based missiles were withdrawn from Cuba. Cited explicitly were President Kennedy's words that peace would be assured only "if all offensive missiles are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future."
Moscow characteristically answered the specific accusation by denying a substantially different charge; it had not been constructing "its own military base" in Cuba. Assuredly the Russians would never stake out a sovereign autonomous base area such as Guantanamo, or the British bases in Cyprus; but a "foreign base" was not at issue in 1962 either. As in other confrontations, a vehement Soviet denial of X can be a signal of a withdrawal of Y, and Pentagon sources by October 13 professed to have seen signs of a halt on the project. While a submarine tender, a large tug and two barges had been sighted in the harbor at Cienfuegos, the tug and the submarine tender had steamed out of the harbor on October 10, as if to return to the Soviet Union. On October 17, however, the two ships turned back to Mariel, a port on the northwest coast of Cuba; on November 10, they returned to Cienfuegos. A few more inconclusive sorties into the Caribbean followed, in what American officials now describe as a "cat and mouse game." Finally, on January 8, 1971, a Pentagon spokesman cautiously reported that the submarine tender had been tracked into the mid-Atlantic, apparently on its way back to the Soviet Union; however, on February 5, another tender was sailing toward Cuba.
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With exclusive access to newly opened Soviet records, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali reveal that Kennedy blinked too soon and Khrushchev declared victory.
To recall the atmosphere of September and October 1962 now seems almost as difficult as to recreate the weeks, more than two decades earlier, before the attack on Pearl Harbor. But if we are to understand the onset of the Cuban missile crisis, it is worth the effort. Indeed we may learn something about the problems of foreseeing and forestalling or, at any rate, diminishing the severity of such crises by examining side by side the preludes to both these major turning points in American history. In juxtaposing these temporally separate events, our interest is in understanding rather than in drama. We would like to know not only how we felt, but what we did and what we might have done, and in particular what we knew or what we could have known before each crisis.
There is disagreement on the relevance of the Cuban missile crisis to today's world. Either there are many lessons, emphasizing the need for flexibility, precision and caution, or there are none, because the nuclear danger in 1962 was imaginary and represented only a failure to comprehend US military superiority. One can conclude that the crisis should not be dismissed as irrelevant; certain crucial factors have not changed. But there is a need for caution in attempting to read from it simple lessons in crisis management. See also Cohen in 1986:03556
