As in many other parts of the world, the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States in India are widely assumed to be in "conflict." To what extent is this conflict genuine, and what are the implications for Asia in general and South Asia in particular?
As in many other parts of the world, the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States in India are widely assumed to be in "conflict." To what extent is this conflict genuine, and what are the implications for Asia in general and South Asia in particular?
America and Russia have each made major contributions to India's economic development. The United States has helped rebuild and modernize India's railroads, contributed 60 percent of the capital for India's power development, helped build and staff eight agricultural universities, provided nearly 40 million tons of foodgrains, printed millions of books for Indian schools, published four excellent magazines to help Indians better understand America, provided thousands of American technicians and made it possible for thousands of Indians to go to America for training and advanced education. The size of the U.S. Peace Corps in India has been double that in any other nation.
Although the Soviet economic investment in India is considerably less, it has been substantial. The U.S.S.R. has helped expand the production of steel and heavy electrical equipment and has provided close to one billion dollars to modernize India's army, navy and air force. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have, in addition, sent to India a steady stream of singers, musicians, and cultural exhibits, the number of Soviet programs being at least double our own. Both have large embassies in New Delhi.
Although Soviet and American activities and programs in India are somewhat similar, the political objectives and tactics have differed sharply. Let us first consider the U.S.S.R.
When Nazi Germany invaded the U.S.S.R. in June 1941, the promotion of Lenin's doctrine of worldwide revolution was muted and communist parties abroad were directed to focus all their energies on winning the war. This forced the Communist Party of India to coöperate with the British colonial government and largely to dissociate itself at a crucial moment from the struggle for independence. The reaction of the non-communist Indian leaders and the tens of millions who supported them was bitter. When official Soviet organs attacked Gandhi as a "reactionary Hindu" and depicted Nehru as the "Chiang Kaishek of India," the gap seemed unbridgeable.
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