In fighting the Indochina war, the United States has made extensive use of two chemical agents: tear gas and herbicides. As debate on the Geneva Protocol banning chemical and biological warfare continues within the U.S. Senate and the Administration, two highly charged issues-Vietnam and man's destruction of his environment-are likely to merge. For it is the Administration's contention that the United States should ratify the Protocol with the understanding "that it does not prohibit the use in war of riot-control agents [tear gas] and chemical herbicides." A large number of Senators, however, consider that the Protocol prohibits the use of both, and feel that the Administration understanding dilutes the significance of U.S. ratification. Consequently, the members of the Foreign Relations Committee are not likely to vote the Protocol out of committee in its present form. And until the President replies to their criticism it appears that no action will be taken on it.
In fighting the Indochina war, the United States has made extensive use of two chemical agents: tear gas and herbicides. As debate on the Geneva Protocol banning chemical and biological warfare continues within the U.S. Senate and the Administration, two highly charged issues-Vietnam and man's destruction of his environment-are likely to merge. For it is the Administration's contention that the United States should ratify the Protocol with the understanding "that it does not prohibit the use in war of riot-control agents [tear gas] and chemical herbicides." A large number of Senators, however, consider that the Protocol prohibits the use of both, and feel that the Administration understanding dilutes the significance of U.S. ratification. Consequently, the members of the Foreign Relations Committee are not likely to vote the Protocol out of committee in its present form. And until the President replies to their criticism it appears that no action will be taken on it.
Although debate both within the Administration and before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has centered around the wording of the Protocol and how it is to be understood, partisans on both sides of the question admit that the issues involved are considerably broader and more complex. In addition to the question of the use of herbicides and tear gas in South Vietnam, the progress of current chemical and biological warfare discussions at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva may hinge on the outcome of the current "understandings debate" and the ultimate fate of the Protocol.
To date, the Nixon Administration has compiled an excellent record in limiting chemical and biological weapons. In November 1969 the President reaffirmed the renunciation by the United States of the first use of lethal chemical weapons and went beyond previous policy statements by including incapacitating chemicals as well. The President also unilaterally renounced all possession and use of biological weapons even on a retaliatory basis and went so far as to impose limitations on research in this field. In February 1970 the President extended these renunciations to include toxins (biologically produced chemical agents). Elaborate plans for destruction of existing stocks of various agents are presently being put into effect.
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Science and the increase of population are the major dynamics of our time. Science promises civilization its highest fulfillment but simultaneously threatens its survival. A billion more people will populate the earth in 10 years, three to four billion more in 30. No one can escape the combined impact of mass population and technology. We are, finally, truly interdependent.
Eighteen months after its enunciation at Guam the Nixon Doctrine remains obscure and contradictory in its intent and application. It is not simply that the wider pattern of war in Indochina challenges the Doctrine's promise of a lower posture in Asia. More than that, close analysis and the unfolding of events expose some basic flaws in the logic of the Administration's evolving security policy for the new decade. The Nixon Doctrine properly includes more than the declaratory policy orientation. It comprises also the revised worldwide security strategy of "1½ wars" and the new defense decision-making processes such as "fiscal guidance budgeting." These elements have received little comment, especially in their integral relation to our commitments in Asia. But the effects of this Administration's moves in these areas will shape and constrain the choices of the United States for a long time to come.
Reexamining the 30 and more years since Indochina entered the agenda of world problems one is struck constantly by the curious mirages, the discordance between image and reality which seem to persist not only in American perceptions of Indochina but in the evaluations by other great powers and the Indochinese themselves of the actual nature and goals of U.S. policy.

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