After more than a quarter-century of formally close contact, the real relationship of the American and the Japanese peoples is like that of two men observing each other through the flawed glass and distorting mirrors of a fun-house. Their perspectives are strikingly, sometimes absurdly different Our dealings of the last 25 years-one war, a successful occupation, unnumbered seminars, government conferences, student exchanges and an $11 billion yearly trade relationship-seem not to have clarified the view.
After more than a quarter-century of formally close contact, the real relationship of the American and the Japanese peoples is like that of two men observing each other through the flawed glass and distorting mirrors of a fun-house. Their perspectives are strikingly, sometimes absurdly different Our dealings of the last 25 years-one war, a successful occupation, unnumbered seminars, government conferences, student exchanges and an $11 billion yearly trade relationship-seem not to have clarified the view.
This would be tolerable in the cases of many nations less closely involved with one another, or in times less troubled. But Japan is not only the principal U.S. trading partner and a pledged political ally; it is the one great world power-outside the West European complex-which shares with the United States common social aspirations, a strikingly similar urban- technological way of life and an intelligent devotion to the democratic principle. The failure, more plainly, of Americans to see Japan and its people as they really are is coming to affect us badly.
For Japanese-American relations are backing into a crisis, in large part because neither party can perceive the other's position. Trade confrontations have escalated into virtual economic warfare. And politically, on the heels of Okinawa revisionism and vexing questions about Japanese "rearmament," came the July announcement of President Nixon's invitation to Peking. The 180-degree turn in the American attitude toward China, made conspicuously without advice from Tokyo and without informing Tokyo in advance, has dramatized the distorted perspectives as nothing else could.
Where and how do they differ? The View from There, i.e. the United States as the average Japanese sees it, is at least a three-dimensional study. He sees a people whose achievements and energies spell competence. His regard for American technological skill and the essential modernity of things American verges on the superstitious. American politics, as copiously reported in the Japanese press, may seem an unpredictable blend of toughness and indecision, but even among the far Left there is a certain respect for American "fairness" and "democratic principles."
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Although Japan and China have close economic ties, their diplomatic relations have been strained by clashing interests and cultural friction. The United States has an important role to play in promoting cooperation between Tokyo and Beijing and helping them adjust to a new phase in East Asia's history.
The provisions of the Japanese Constitution barring the resort to war as an instrument of Japanese policy, and effectively committing Japan not to maintain armed forces on a major scale, has long raised the question how Japan's security is to be assured in a world still replete with sources of international conflict. As late as 1948 it was still General MacArthur's view, if the writer of these lines understood him correctly, that it would not be essential for the United States to maintain armed forces on the Japanese archipelago permanently or for a protracted time either for its own security or for that of Japan; in his view, the most suitable status for Japan would be one of permanent demilitarization and neutralization under such general protection as might be afforded by the United Nations and by the friendly interest of the United States. He appeared to believe, as did this writer, that if such a status could be arranged with the concurrence of the Soviet Government, the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Japan would be minimal; and it was not easy to see from what other quarter Japan could be seriously threatened. This concept assumed, of course, an eventual agreement between the Soviet Union, the United States and other interested parties, on the terms of a Japanese peace settlement.
The Clinton administration inherits strained bilateral relations with the leading powers of Asia and no coherent policy for the Asia / Pacific region as a whole. Trade, security and diplomatic style are the overarching challenges and on all three counts prominent Asians are worried. They fear a president bent on building trade walls, bringing home American troops and lecturing on human rights. Yet respect for the United States remains instinctive throughout the region, particularly given convincing progress in rejuvenating the American economy. Asia's quest for economic growth and more democratic government awaits leadership from Washington.
