The Other South Vietnam: Toward the Breaking Point
The situation in South Vietnam grew perceptibly more fluid in 1971. With the continuing withdrawal of U.S. forces, the reverses suffered by the South Vietnamese troops in southern Laos in the spring and the political crisis of the autumn, the Saigon régime weakened and "Vietnamization" was dealt a hard blow. The structure which had stood for three years buttressed by American military power revealed its fragility at the very moment when public opinion in Vietnam and in the United States was showing ever- increasing war-weariness. As the American grip gradually loosened, unrest spread in a society overwhelmed by the disorder of the times, for which war had become a way of life. Even before the American military engagement was definitely coming to its end, the rhythm of public life had begun to change. It was as if South Vietnam were preparing to search-with much effort and difficulty, to be sure-for a new balance.
The situation in South Vietnam grew perceptibly more fluid in 1971. With the continuing withdrawal of U.S. forces, the reverses suffered by the South Vietnamese troops in southern Laos in the spring and the political crisis of the autumn, the Saigon régime weakened and "Vietnamization" was dealt a hard blow. The structure which had stood for three years buttressed by American military power revealed its fragility at the very moment when public opinion in Vietnam and in the United States was showing ever- increasing war-weariness. As the American grip gradually loosened, unrest spread in a society overwhelmed by the disorder of the times, for which war had become a way of life. Even before the American military engagement was definitely coming to its end, the rhythm of public life had begun to change. It was as if South Vietnam were preparing to search-with much effort and difficulty, to be sure-for a new balance.
II
The institutions established in 1967 confronted their first real test in the presidential election of October 1971-a test which they did not pass with any noticeable success. The Constitution was flouted by the adoption of a bill designed to set aside the candidacy of Vice President Ky, who since the beginning of 1971 had acted as a catalyst in the political arena. When General Duong Van Minh withdrew from the contest, however, a fresh manipulation of the law by the Supreme Court was unable to revive Ky's candidacy. At this point, President Thieu preferred-with resigned American acquiescence-to maintain his now unique candidacy for the presidency; thus he was perfectly prepared to offend a majority of the voters, beginning with the Catholics. Perhaps the régime would have fared no better in a genuinely contested election. In any case, the imposing percentage (94.3 percent of the votes cast) to which Thieu treated himself strengthened neither his position nor the credit of a Constitution which the population had hardly been allowed to take seriously. The question, in fact, was not whether or not the South was ready for democracy, but whether political life could make itself felt within the framework of institutions imposed on the generals, nearly five years earlier, by their American protectors.
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During the last week of April 1970 the Vietnam war became the Second Indochina War. On April 24 and 25 representatives of the four movements of the Indochinese Left convened at a certain spot in south China to seal an alliance that had been contracted many years before by three of the movements-the North Vietnamese Lao Dong, the Pathet Lao and the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF)-and to which Prince Sihanouk, overthrown a month earlier by the Cambodian Right, was now adhering in a conspicuously unconditional manner. The Indochinese revolutionary front thus came into being.
The theory of the falling dominoes in Southeast Asia has been the subject of heated debate. Yet few sensible observers would deny that a settlement in Viet Nam will have a significant impact on the overall course of political evolution in the area and, conversely, that changing political conditions in Southeast Asia will affect the outlook for a permanent settlement in Viet Nam. Even in the shorter perspective, the chances of finding a stable compromise solution acceptable to the fighting parties appear greater when seen in the broader framework than when we view the problem in its strictly Vietnamese dimensions. For in the narrow context of the two Viet Nams there seem to be no conceivable alternatives which do not imply a significant victory for one side and a defeat for the other.
Reexamining the 30 and more years since Indochina entered the agenda of world problems one is struck constantly by the curious mirages, the discordance between image and reality which seem to persist not only in American perceptions of Indochina but in the evaluations by other great powers and the Indochinese themselves of the actual nature and goals of U.S. policy.
