In July 1972, amid mounting public clamor for "a change in the political current," Kakuei Tanaka became Prime Minister of Japan. He pledged a policy of "resolution and action." Two months later, in the course of a five-day visit to China, Tanaka turned Japan's China policy completely around.
In July 1972, amid mounting public clamor for "a change in the political current," Kakuei Tanaka became Prime Minister of Japan. He pledged a policy of "resolution and action." Two months later, in the course of a five-day visit to China, Tanaka turned Japan's China policy completely around.
This dramatic shift, with the earlier visits of President Nixon to Peking and Moscow, has prompted Japanese observers to pose a host of questions. Have we witnessed simply an agreement to open diplomatic relations between the governments of the two big powers in Asia, or are we looking at the still dim outline of a new "Tokyo-Peking axis"? Should not Japan now review completely her other foreign policies, which have been excessively dependent on the United States, and go her own way hereafter amid a general easing of tensions in East Asia? With rapprochement in the air, why does Japan need a special security relationship with the United States? Can Japan achieve a successful, independent foreign policy without becoming a big military power? What sort of impact will Japan's rapprochement with China have on Japan's relations with Southeast Asia and the two Koreas? What effect will recent Japanese moves have on the Soviet-American-Chinese triangle and on the constraints which operate on each of these relationships? Has the fragile balance of power among these three been upset?
Of all the Japanese national sports, judo is perhaps the best known throughout the world. In judo, beginners are first required to undergo thorough training in mastering the passive art of being "thrown down." This defensive technique is intended to enable one thrown by his opponent to fall without being hurt, so that he is ready for the next action. Only after one has attained sufficient adeptness at that art is he allowed to learn a full variety of offensive tactics.
As if in compliance with this art, Japan's postwar diplomacy has always been passive, and has seldom played a positive role on its own in the arena of international politics. This was the result of Japan's loss of self- confidence through her defeat in World War II, and in a sense was inevitable and even natural. Even her policy toward China was no exception to the passive character of Japan's diplomacy. Japan was the last of America's major allies to part from the United States on the question of Taiwan and China, having faithfully followed the U.S. policy ever since the War.
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The major events of 1983 in East Asian politics and economics can be looked at from three broad vantage points or planes of abstraction. At the most general level one sees, rather like the movements of tectonic plates on the earth's surface, a slight shift in the center of gravity of U.S. foreign policy from Europe toward Asia. In large part this shift is prompted by a growing realization among the leaders of the United States and Japan that their nations will, for the indefinite future, be paramount in the fundamental sciences and their practical offshoots in microelectronics, biotechnology, fine ceramics, and other new areas of technical development, and that Western Europe will trail in most of these fields and the Soviet Union simply be left behind. The fact that the American President met with the prime minister of Japan three times during 1983 underscores this trend, as did the President's statement in Tokyo in November that "No relationship between any two countries is more important to world peace and prosperity than the relationship between the United States and Japan."
Ichiro Ozawa, a former power broker in the Liberal Democratic Party, has become a seminal figure of Japan's reform movement. A leader of the up-and-coming New Frontier Party, in 1993 he wrote an influential bestseller, Blueprint for a New Japan, that helped define the national debates over democratic reform, social issues, and foreign policy. He views himself as Meiji-type leader, trying to awaken Japan to the changes in the outside world. But many of the Japanese are wary of the savvy backroom dealmaker. In any case, his views are helping chart Japan's diplomatic course: a more engaged global role coupled with a resilient U.S. partnership.
The Asian financial crisis had a side benefit: prodding the Japanese government to fix its economy. But as the sense of urgency eased, so too did the momentum for change. The Liberal Democratic Party, never a true champion of reform, now blocks deregulation from every angle. Wasteful public spending has created little but debt. And the public's trust in its government is all but gone. Recovery would require Japan's politicians to give up the many benefits of the status quo, which they will not do without a fight. So Japan's reforms are stalled permanently. Its economy is, too.

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