A European Security Conference (ESC) will almost certainly take place in 1973. It will convene with active, if reluctant, American participation. This unfortunate reluctance is especially pronounced in Washington. The United States now has not only an opportunity but a responsibility to lead the Western nations in a search for a new system in Europe. In view of the inevitability of the conference, it would be especially short-sighted to forsake the dynamic and innovative role we could play. Unhappily, I see no signs, at least from a vantage point on Capitol Hill, that the United States will enter this decisive stage with any policy ideas which might wrest the initiative from the East. The Western impetus for a constructive conference comes almost entirely from some of our NATO allies, whose cautious enthusiasm is under a steady restraint from the Washington flagship of the Atlantic Alliance.
A European Security Conference (ESC) will almost certainly take place in 1973. It will convene with active, if reluctant, American participation. This unfortunate reluctance is especially pronounced in Washington. The United States now has not only an opportunity but a responsibility to lead the Western nations in a search for a new system in Europe. In view of the inevitability of the conference, it would be especially short-sighted to forsake the dynamic and innovative role we could play. Unhappily, I see no signs, at least from a vantage point on Capitol Hill, that the United States will enter this decisive stage with any policy ideas which might wrest the initiative from the East. The Western impetus for a constructive conference comes almost entirely from some of our NATO allies, whose cautious enthusiasm is under a steady restraint from the Washington flagship of the Atlantic Alliance.
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The Soviet Union first proposed such a conference in 1954 to forestall West German rearmament. As a manifestation of Russian refusal to recognize the legitimacy of a U.S. presence, Americans were to be relegated to observer status.
Although cold-war tensions effectively mooted positive security moves in Europe for a decade, a breakthrough came in 1964. In a U.N. speech, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki revived the prospects for an ESC and his remarks were shortly seconded by the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee. Only after the setback in détente diplomacy following the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, however, did the Warsaw Pact change its position and agree to full participatory status for the United States and Canada.
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Prediction is a chancy business. Nevertheless, one cannot consider policy without making some general judgments (or if you like assumptions) about likely developments. My first assumption is that the countries of the Alliance as a whole will continue to have the resources and dynamic to contribute to shaping the future. We are not and shall not be simply in the position of having to respond to events. The combined gross domestic product of the countries of the Alliance is 55 percent of total world gross domestic product. Our present share of world trade is also 55 percent. I assume that there will be no substantial recession in world trade, and I believe that we shall at least maintain our share of it. There should therefore be no lack of material resources for the countries of the Alliance. Nevertheless, our ability to attain the objects of our policies will be limited by various factors.
Throughout its existence, the Atlantic Alliance has reflected a complex and dynamic process-a "transatlantic bargain." The former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Harlan Cleveland, has described this "bargain" as partly an understanding among the European members of the Alliance, but mostly a deal between them and the United States. NATO, he contends, is an arena of organized controversy. "Each year the mix of NATO defense forces and the character of allied political collaboration change, adjusting to the shifting technology of war and to ... the tides of domestic politics in each of the fifteen NATO countries. But while the bargain changes, the constant is a consensus among the allies that there has to be a bargain."
Antony Blinken has missed a fundamental transformation at work. America and Europe may still share values and interests, but Europe and the world have changed profoundly since the Cold War. The transatlantic relationship must change, too.

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