A PROFOUND shift is taking place in the relations between the United States and Western Europe. Though there is a temptation to think of the shift as the result of yesterday's headlines, its causes run a good deal deeper, and its consequences are likely to remain for a long time. For those who assume that the achievement of a moderate world order depends on some sort of working coöperation in the Atlantic area, the implications of the change are deeply disturbing.
AN APPRAISAL OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
A PROFOUND shift is taking place in the relations between the United States and Western Europe. Though there is a temptation to think of the shift as the result of yesterday's headlines, its causes run a good deal deeper, and its consequences are likely to remain for a long time. For those who assume that the achievement of a moderate world order depends on some sort of working coöperation in the Atlantic area, the implications of the change are deeply disturbing.
Throughout most of the period since the end of World War II, the economic relations between Western Europe and the United States have been conditioned by a few fundamental considerations. First and overwhelming was the question of relative size. The United States was five or six times as big as any state in Western Europe, and it enjoyed the highest per capita income by a large margin. Second, the United States was profoundly self- confident. When occasional uncertainties arose over national purpose, they were usually internal matters, matters that had very little to do with the country's perception of its place in international affairs. Beyond that, the United States Could be counted on to use its strength, so most West Europeans assumed, in ways that were not blatantly hostile to Western Europe. Finally, the problem of America's disparate size was commonly thought of as only a transitional state, until the time when a united Western Europe would develop which was equal in dimensions to the United States.
Today, the assumption that the United States could be expected to use its great economic and military strength in benign and unhostile ways has been badly eroded in Western Europe. The Suez crisis of the 1950s may have begun the process; but, so far as many Europeans were concerned, it was fortified by the U.S. role in Vietnam, ratified by the U.S. decision unilaterally to suspend the convertibility of the dollar, and confirmed by the independent style of the United States in the conduct of its new Ostpolitik...
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A European Security Conference (ESC) will almost certainly take place in 1973. It will convene with active, if reluctant, American participation. This unfortunate reluctance is especially pronounced in Washington. The United States now has not only an opportunity but a responsibility to lead the Western nations in a search for a new system in Europe. In view of the inevitability of the conference, it would be especially short-sighted to forsake the dynamic and innovative role we could play. Unhappily, I see no signs, at least from a vantage point on Capitol Hill, that the United States will enter this decisive stage with any policy ideas which might wrest the initiative from the East. The Western impetus for a constructive conference comes almost entirely from some of our NATO allies, whose cautious enthusiasm is under a steady restraint from the Washington flagship of the Atlantic Alliance.
Twenty-FIVE years have passed since the collapse of Europe. Vienna- Versailles-Potsdam: these historic milestones mark the calamitous decline of the European world order during the last hundred and fifty years.
After President Nixon and I met at Key Biscayne on December 28 and 29, 1971, a commentator pointed out that the joint statement issued on our talks seemed more like an American-European than an American-German communiqué. This, he felt, showed itself even on the surface in that the terms "European" or "Europe" appeared 11 times whereas German" or "Federal Republic of Germany" were only mentioned twice.

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