CAN EUROPE'S SECURITY BE "DECOUPLED" FROM AMERICA?
A New and contentious concept has seeped into the transatlantic dialogue in recent times. It has been suggested that the United States may "decouple" itself from its strategic commitment to Western Europe in the future, or perhaps is in the process of doing so now. The codification of mutual deterrence in the SALT agreements of a year ago, combined with the earlier loss of U.S. nuclear superiority, is seen as having considerably eroded the remaining credibility of the American nuclear guarantee to Europe. Some go further to find in the agreements an implicit understanding between the two superpowers that neither will henceforth initiate the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances short of the direct defense of its own territory. Arid even thoughtful Europeans who still observe the litany of faith in the nuclear guarantee do so with diminished conviction and look for opportunities through coöperative European actions to compensate for a substantial degree of American disengagement.[i]
A New and contentious concept has seeped into the transatlantic dialogue in recent times. It has been suggested that the United States may "decouple" itself from its strategic commitment to Western Europe in the future, or perhaps is in the process of doing so now. The codification of mutual deterrence in the SALT agreements of a year ago, combined with the earlier loss of U.S. nuclear superiority, is seen as having considerably eroded the remaining credibility of the American nuclear guarantee to Europe. Some go further to find in the agreements an implicit understanding between the two superpowers that neither will henceforth initiate the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances short of the direct defense of its own territory. Arid even thoughtful Europeans who still observe the litany of faith in the nuclear guarantee do so with diminished conviction and look for opportunities through coöperative European actions to compensate for a substantial degree of American disengagement.[i]
The issue is, of course, further complicated by growing transatlantic dissonance on trade and monetary issues, which threatens to poison the political-security relationship. Increasingly, the economic interests of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States are seen as pointing more to rivalry than partnership in the future. The emphasis of American leaders on bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and China confirms for many Europeans the loosening of the alignments associated with the postwar balance between East and West. And even the general reassurance in Henry Kissinger's recent epistle to the Europeans calling for a new Atlantic Charter included a reference to "radically different strategic conditions," the full implications of which "have yet to be faced."
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IT would be an exaggeration to describe the current discussion of our relations with the Soviet Union and with Western Europe as another Great Debate. Perhaps in the language of the times it might be called a Mini- Debate, distracted as it is and emotionally charged by events elsewhere which, however, may prove to be less fateful in the long run.
The recent meeting of NATO defense and foreign ministers at Athens ended with the usual proclamations of Allied unity. A great deal was made of the United States commitment of five-and later more-Polaris submarines to NATO. Yet the significance of the meeting went far beyond this largely symbolic gesture. The Athens conference marked the point at which a reassessment of NATO strategy could no longer be avoided. It underlined the urgent need to resolve the debate of the past years about the relative role of nuclear and conventional forces, the relationship of deterrence to strategy and the control and use of nuclear weapons.
For anyone who is a believer in the integration of Europe the present political conjuncture must appear somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, there is a discernible thaw in relations within the Community itself. The resignation of President de Gaulle and a change in French foreign policy (which is none the less real for being denied) have permitted the completion of the Common Market's agricultural policy, some sort of a start has been made on planning a common monetary policy with the Werner Report, and the crucial negotiation for the enlargement of the Community is now under way. After seven years of relative stagnation it might seem as though the creation of an integrated Europe had been resumed-to end perhaps in the emergence of a larger and stronger economic entity which, by the very fact of its greater freedom of action, will hardly be able to avoid political decisions and, hence, concerted political action through appropriate institutions. (By "Europe" is meant not only the Six of the Common Market but also those other West European countries with whom they have close political, economic and cultural relations. Such a definition, moreover, does not exclude the so-called "neutrals," or Spain and Portugal, and it might be hoped that at some point it would be possible to extend it to countries in Eastern Europe.)
