CAN EUROPE'S SECURITY BE "DECOUPLED" FROM AMERICA?
A New and contentious concept has seeped into the transatlantic dialogue in recent times. It has been suggested that the United States may "decouple" itself from its strategic commitment to Western Europe in the future, or perhaps is in the process of doing so now. The codification of mutual deterrence in the SALT agreements of a year ago, combined with the earlier loss of U.S. nuclear superiority, is seen as having considerably eroded the remaining credibility of the American nuclear guarantee to Europe. Some go further to find in the agreements an implicit understanding between the two superpowers that neither will henceforth initiate the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances short of the direct defense of its own territory. Arid even thoughtful Europeans who still observe the litany of faith in the nuclear guarantee do so with diminished conviction and look for opportunities through coöperative European actions to compensate for a substantial degree of American disengagement.[i]
A New and contentious concept has seeped into the transatlantic dialogue in recent times. It has been suggested that the United States may "decouple" itself from its strategic commitment to Western Europe in the future, or perhaps is in the process of doing so now. The codification of mutual deterrence in the SALT agreements of a year ago, combined with the earlier loss of U.S. nuclear superiority, is seen as having considerably eroded the remaining credibility of the American nuclear guarantee to Europe. Some go further to find in the agreements an implicit understanding between the two superpowers that neither will henceforth initiate the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances short of the direct defense of its own territory. Arid even thoughtful Europeans who still observe the litany of faith in the nuclear guarantee do so with diminished conviction and look for opportunities through coöperative European actions to compensate for a substantial degree of American disengagement.[i]
The issue is, of course, further complicated by growing transatlantic dissonance on trade and monetary issues, which threatens to poison the political-security relationship. Increasingly, the economic interests of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States are seen as pointing more to rivalry than partnership in the future. The emphasis of American leaders on bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and China confirms for many Europeans the loosening of the alignments associated with the postwar balance between East and West. And even the general reassurance in Henry Kissinger's recent epistle to the Europeans calling for a new Atlantic Charter included a reference to "radically different strategic conditions," the full implications of which "have yet to be faced."
This is a premium article
You must be a Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you are already a print subscriber, click here to activate your online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
Defends the traditional, pessimistic evaluation of NATO's conventional capabilities against revisionists, and argues that "NATO is highly unlikely to make the conventional force improvements seemingly dictated by the INF treaty". Predicts a Soviet arms control offensive upon "a vulnerable and divided NATO... the alliance has painted itself into a corner, and the paint will not dry". Despite all this, NATO will continue to prevent war in Europe.
The recent meeting of NATO defense and foreign ministers at Athens ended with the usual proclamations of Allied unity. A great deal was made of the United States commitment of five-and later more-Polaris submarines to NATO. Yet the significance of the meeting went far beyond this largely symbolic gesture. The Athens conference marked the point at which a reassessment of NATO strategy could no longer be avoided. It underlined the urgent need to resolve the debate of the past years about the relative role of nuclear and conventional forces, the relationship of deterrence to strategy and the control and use of nuclear weapons.
The rationale of West German foreign policy is very simple: the postwar era has ended. Its hallmarks were high hopes for Western political structures on the one hand, and high tension between East and West on the other. Now a new epoch is in the offing. In the West it is going to be characterized by less ambitious objectives and more pragmatic approaches. The achievements of the fifties and sixties will not be dismantled, but the aims for the immediate future will be lowered. Dreams of "Atlantic Union Now" or "Instant Europe" must give way to expectations more closely geared to realities: wider and deeper coöperation, without necessarily institutional perfection. Between East and West the new era could be one of diminished tension and growing détente, of more coöperation and less confrontation. Not unlike President Nixon, the Bonn government is also trying to "build agreement upon agreement" without in any way deluding itself that this could be a process easily or speedily accomplished.
