Toward a Western Philosophy of Coexistence
The barometer of tension has risen and fallen many times during the last 26 years or so of our relationship with the Soviet Union. While some fear the present abatement is no more than a lull or a truce, it seems probable that we are on our way to some new stage. What the nature of this stage may be, however, has not yet become clear in our public discourse, nor have we begun to clarify for ourselves the direction in which we would like to shape events, to the extent that it lies within our power to do so. Despite the distractions of our time, there is an urgency to the task, for decisions have to be made and they should be governed by a perspective that is larger than our immediate national preoccupations.
The barometer of tension has risen and fallen many times during the last 26 years or so of our relationship with the Soviet Union. While some fear the present abatement is no more than a lull or a truce, it seems probable that we are on our way to some new stage. What the nature of this stage may be, however, has not yet become clear in our public discourse, nor have we begun to clarify for ourselves the direction in which we would like to shape events, to the extent that it lies within our power to do so. Despite the distractions of our time, there is an urgency to the task, for decisions have to be made and they should be governed by a perspective that is larger than our immediate national preoccupations.
Let us begin with three questions: How should the present stage of our relations with the Soviet Union be characterized? Are we witnessing a historic shift in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union? What should be our philosophy toward our relations with the Communist world, our objectives, our criteria for weighing alternative policies?
II
For those who live by words or phrases that sum up the entire situation at a glance, there is no simple substitute for the term "cold war." That term was once defined by the late George Lichtheim as "competitive attempts to alter the balance of power (between the Soviet Union and the United States) without overt resort to force." By this definition, the term still has a certain validity, although it does not convey the elements of collaborative action which have lately become evident; moreover, the term has acquired such emotional baggage, such connotations of absolute and intractable hostility, that it deserves to be retired. The ambiguities of the word "détente," which has come into wide usage, have led to much confusion. In its simplest meaning, "détente" suggests a relaxation of tension, but some have taken this to mean a "rapprochement," while others see it as signifying only a subjective easing in the symptoms of tension without any real change in its causes; they sometimes use the term "true détente" to distinguish a more fundamental moderation in the adversary relationship.
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We have been accustomed, during most of the past 25 years, to think of our security in terms of the containment of Soviet expansionism, relying largely upon a comfortable superiority in military power. A number of developments now call into question the adequacy of this conception and of our understanding of the nature of effective power in the modern world.
Our reactions to Soviet foreign policy have a way of jumping from one extreme to another, both in the long and short run, with more regard for changing superficial appearances than permanent objective factors. During the last year of the Second World War, we tended to idealize the Russians, Stalin became "Uncle Joe" to be charmed by Roosevelt into coöperation, and the United Nations, having done away with "power politics," was supposed to be the vehicle of that coöperation. From 1947 onwards, the Kremlin was perceived as the headquarters of the devil on earth, causing all that was wrong with the world and, more particularly, scheming the destruction of the United States. These extreme swings of the pendulum can also be observed in much shorter time spans.
Since September of 1970 a renewal of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis has been in prospect Highly placed White House sources reported that the Soviet Union had begun work on a submarine base on the southern coast of Cuba at Cienfuegos, a base which could repair and refuel missile-firing submarines of the Soviet Navy. Warnings were issued that this would be viewed with the "utmost seriousness" by the United States as a violation of the 1962 agreement by which land-based missiles were withdrawn from Cuba. Cited explicitly were President Kennedy's words that peace would be assured only "if all offensive missiles are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future."
