Dilemmas of Détente: Most-Favored-Nation and Less Favorite Nations
The Amendment submitted by Senator Henry Jackson to the Administration's pending Trade Reform bill, along with its counterpart in the House of Representatives, is a curious blend of foreign policy idealism and domestic politics. The exaggerated claims of both proponents and opponents in the long and often emotional debate over the Amendment cannot obscure the underlying issue, which is as old as the nation-state-whether and when should one nation apply pressure to alter those policies or practices of another which, if not exclusively "internal" in impact, are at least not clearly within the traditional foreign policy realm. Although any amendment enjoying the formal sponsorship of nearly four-fifths of the members of the Senate and nearly two-thirds of the members of the House appears almost certain to be passed in one form or another, both the Congress and the Administration must now think through more carefully the implications and consequences of enacting the Amendment in its present form.
The Amendment submitted by Senator Henry Jackson to the Administration's pending Trade Reform bill, along with its counterpart in the House of Representatives, is a curious blend of foreign policy idealism and domestic politics. The exaggerated claims of both proponents and opponents in the long and often emotional debate over the Amendment cannot obscure the underlying issue, which is as old as the nation-state-whether and when should one nation apply pressure to alter those policies or practices of another which, if not exclusively "internal" in impact, are at least not clearly within the traditional foreign policy realm. Although any amendment enjoying the formal sponsorship of nearly four-fifths of the members of the Senate and nearly two-thirds of the members of the House appears almost certain to be passed in one form or another, both the Congress and the Administration must now think through more carefully the implications and consequences of enacting the Amendment in its present form.
II
The Jackson Amendment would deny to any "nonmarket economy country" eligibility for most-favored-nation tariff treatment (MFN) and participation in the Federal government's export credit, credit guarantee and investment guarantee programs during any period in which that country denies to its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate, specifically by imposing more than a nominal tax or other charge. The primary objective of the Amendment is the elimination of Soviet "education" or exit taxes and other restrictions on the emigration to Israel of Soviet Jews.
That is a worthy objective, consistent with basic principles of human rights, with which few can in good conscience disagree. (I personally have supported free Jewish emigration in addresses in the Soviet Union as well as the United States.) As a means of achieving this objective, however-even as a somewhat awkward vehicle for conveying congressional support for it-the Amendment, to say nothing of the debate thereon, has been less clearly focused. For in fact it attempts too much to be effective and too little to be meaningful.
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If the world should erupt before these words are in print, the fault is unlikely to lie with the policy of détente. So far, the advantages of détente have been somewhat more evident than the costs. The capacity of the two superpowers to communicate effectively in the white heat of the Middle East crisis, for instance, must surely be counted as a significant dividend.
No factor is more needful of fresh consideration in both the practice and study of American foreign policy than its domestic underpinnings. For despite the recent example of Vietnam, a war that created bitter domestic conflict which itself played back upon the war, the tendency lingers within the foreign-affairs community to frame policy exclusively in terms of the perceived requirements of the international environment. President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger, of course, hope to receive public support. But their plain inclination is less to submit the shaping and executing of foreign policy to the domestic political process than to make what minimal policy adjustments they must in order to keep themselves in control of the policy. For them, this is a matter of constitutional legitimacy as well as diplomatic necessity and, for the President, political advantage.
Trade between the United States and the Soviet Union is unlikely ever to reach mammoth proportions, regardless of political considerations or even economic systems. It is equally unlikely that either nation would ever consider such trade economically indispensable or even significantly beneficial. Nevertheless, the tendency in some quarters in the United States to dismiss both the prospects and the political importance of such trade should be less readily accepted.
