Among the issues on which Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill differed, none was more pregnant with meaning for the future than their respective assessments of the coming international role of China. The American President saw China as a potential major power, a force that would bulk large in the postwar era, particularly in Asia. The British Prime Minister regarded China as an "emerging society," to use the vernacular of today, one certain to be beset by multiple internal problems for the foreseeable future and hence incapable of sustaining a consistent, forceful international position. In retrospect, one can say that vital elements of truth lay with both assessments, and from this fact stem the complexities of Chinese foreign policy today.
Among the issues on which Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill differed, none was more pregnant with meaning for the future than their respective assessments of the coming international role of China. The American President saw China as a potential major power, a force that would bulk large in the postwar era, particularly in Asia. The British Prime Minister regarded China as an "emerging society," to use the vernacular of today, one certain to be beset by multiple internal problems for the foreseeable future and hence incapable of sustaining a consistent, forceful international position. In retrospect, one can say that vital elements of truth lay with both assessments, and from this fact stem the complexities of Chinese foreign policy today.
At the outset, therefore, let us focus briefly upon those contradictory elements of power and weakness that give to China her unique qualities, and shape in such considerable measure Chinese attitudes and policies in the international arena. After two decades of being consigned to the role of outlaw among nations, the People's Republic of China with dramatic suddenness has been elevated to the status of great power in the United Nations, achieved near-universal diplomatic recognition, and even acquired client states in the fashion of other major powers. Nor are the recent changes confined to status. China now visibly possesses one of the world's significant military forces, with rapidly expanding nuclear as well as conventional capacities. To the extent that power is psychological, moreover, the Chinese leaders appear to have adjusted to the role of "world leadership" with minimal difficulty. Indeed, some would assert that given China's historic cultural traditions and the intense nationalist tides currently running, this was the easiest of all adjustments. The present Chinese political elite are proud men, determined to avenge China's past humiliations in the briefest possible time. In the fashion of the Meiji leaders of late nineteenth-century Japan, they want a "rich country-strong soldiery" so that they can face the world on at least equal terms. Meanwhile, they have shown little hesitation in expressing themselves eloquently on a wide range of global issues, and accepting command responsibility on the few occasions when the opportunity presented itself.
This is a premium article
You must be a Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you are already a print subscriber, click here to activate your online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
Reexamining the 30 and more years since Indochina entered the agenda of world problems one is struck constantly by the curious mirages, the discordance between image and reality which seem to persist not only in American perceptions of Indochina but in the evaluations by other great powers and the Indochinese themselves of the actual nature and goals of U.S. policy.
Liberal democracy, led by the United States, may have emerged triumphant from the great struggles of the twentieth century. But the post-Cold War rise of economically successful -- and nondemocratic -- China and Russia may represent a viable alternative path to modernity that leaves liberal democracy's ultimate victory and future dominance in doubt.
CIVIL war on the mainland of Asia, in a small country with a tradition of disorder and yet with a millennial record of persistent national identity, has mushroomed into the biggest politico-military issue of the times, comparable to the Arab-Israeli conflict in outside repercussions but far exceeding it in scale of operations. Exceeding it also in complexity. In the Middle East the issues are relatively simple and plain to see. In Viet Nam they are blurred. In the South the fighting is not even recognized as civil war but viewed as insurgency aggravated by intervention from the North.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.