World Oil Cooperation or International Chaos
Rarely, if ever, in postwar history has the world been confronted with problems as serious as those caused by recent changes in the supply and price conditions of the world oil trade. To put these changes into proper perspective, they must be evaluated not only in economic and financial terms but also in the framework of their political and strategic implications.
Rarely, if ever, in postwar history has the world been confronted with problems as serious as those caused by recent changes in the supply and price conditions of the world oil trade. To put these changes into proper perspective, they must be evaluated not only in economic and financial terms but also in the framework of their political and strategic implications.
I need not dwell here on the overwhelming importance of oil for the energy requirements of every country in the world; nor do I plan to elaborate on the fact that-except for the United States, the Soviet Union and a small number of countries that are, or will become, self-sufficient-most of the nations of the world will, at least for the foreseeable future, depend almost entirely on imports from a handful of oil-exporting countries, with an overwhelming concentration of oil production and reserves in the Persian Gulf area of the Middle East. Among those countries in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia is predominant in terms of reserves, production, and most important, in the potential to provide significant expansion of supplies. Inevitably, producing decisions by Middle East governments, especially Saudi Arabia, will play a pivotal role in future world oil availability and pricing.
Over the last three years or so, oil-producing countries have in fact taken over complete control of the oil industry in their countries. They have coördinated their efforts through the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) which was established in 1960. Since 1970, producing governments have imposed in rapid succession changes in previous agreements that had been negotiated and renegotiated with their concession-holding companies, predominantly affiliates of the Anglo-American international oil companies. These changes were arrived at under the threat that if the oil companies would not acquiesce, the producing countries would legislate such changes unilaterally or expropriate the concessions. In October 1973 the last vestige of negotiations was abandoned and producing governments unilaterally set posted prices on their oil.
This is a premium article
You must be a logged in Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you wish to continue reading this article please subscribe , or activate your online account to get full online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
For the last five years the world has been trying to cope with a set of problems triggered by the sudden oil price explosion of late 1973: the availability of oil to cover future energy demand, the economic and financial upheaval attending the jump in oil prices, and the utilization of a flood of petrodollars by OPEC countries for their national development and other purposes. These three issues are intimately interrelated and interact on each other; they can thus be properly assessed only in conjunction with each other.
The quadrupling of oil import prices in one year, quite apart from Arab supply cutbacks, has greatly increased the urgency and gravity of the questions that were lurking in the shadows even in the earlier, balmier days of the energy crisis.1 No less an authority than the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has warned that the combination of oil shortages and price increases in 1974 is likely to produce "a staggering disequilibrium in the global balance of payments . . . that will place strains on the monetary system far in excess of any that have been experienced since the war." And Treasury Secretary Shultz has stated that the recent oil price increases raised "literally unmanageable" problems for many nations.
From 1947 to 1973 the shift of power is exponential. In 1947 the United States ceased to be a net exporter of oil; the basing point for oil prices moved from the Gulf of Mexico to the Persian Gulf, and with it the underlying leverage. Although the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed in 1960, its membership was so disparate that at first it did little to exploit the shift. With prices low, U.S. dependence on imported energy grew to 14 percent of energy consumption in 1972. Europe's dependence on energy imports grew from 33 percent in 1960 to 65 percent in 1972; Japan's from 43 to 90 percent in the same period. By the late 1960s OPEC members were acting more masterfully to turn the increased dependence to advantage; prices began to move up. The 1973 October War revealed OPEC's full power.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.